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ABSTRACT 
CONSTANT CRISIS: A STUDY OF THE U.S. MILITARY'S 
CRISIS COMMUNICATION PROGRAM 
by Alyson M. Teeter-Baker 
This study analyzes the U.S. military's crisis communication program. Military 
documents were analyzed and current and former military public affairs personnel were 
interviewed to understand the military's crisis communication program and how it 
correlates to the Horsley and Baker's (2002) synthesis model. Historical wartime cases 
were examined to uncover patterns in its communication practices. This study confirms 
that the military's crisis communication program correlates closely with the synthesis 
model. But the military's communication efforts often failed in the aftermath of past 
crises due to its authoritarian culture and justice system. The authoritarian culture 
compelled the military to use unethical tactics, such as lying and censoring, yet these 
tactics became less common through time as communication technologies advanced. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A crisis can hit any organization at any time, and a failed crisis communication 
strategy could tarnish the image, credibility, and performance of an organization for 
many years. Crisis communication events in war have made headlines since Vietnam, 
and continue to generate public outrage and controversy. By virtue of its position in U.S. 
history and culture, the military receives an abundance of attention and scrutiny. 
According to Coombs (2007), events that could have gone under the public's radar 
decades ago are now highly visible because of technology and the creation of the 24-hour 
news networks. Crises are now global because of the technological advancements, 
especially during war. 
April 2004 The New Yorker's Seymour Hersh and CBS 60 Minutes //broke news 
that almost instantly made headlines around the world. U.S. soldiers stationed at a 
military prison called Abu Ghraib in Iraq were photographed abusing Iraqi prisoners. In 
one photograph an Iraqi detainee is standing on a box wearing a black Ku Klux Klan-like 
robe with what appears to be electrodes attached to his body. This photograph and 
hundreds of others were taken in 2003. The Abu Ghraib abuse scandal was a preventable 
crisis and hampered the war effort. In response to this crisis, did the military's crisis 
communication tactics cause more harm than good? 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the U.S. military's crisis communication 
program. The U.S. military and its crisis communication efforts have been heavily 
criticized during past events, but there is a void of academic study regarding the 
military's crisis communications program. For the purposes of this study, the "military 
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crisis communication program" refers to those characteristics common to the U.S. 
military's training tools and regulations. The military term for public relations is "public 
affairs," and has an equivalent definition in this study. 
Military documents, training material, and interview transcripts were researched 
to assess the state of the military's crisis communication program. Contemporary crisis 
communication literature was reviewed and compared with the content analysis and 
interview data. To help extrapolate the evolution of the crisis communication program, 
three wartime cases were analyzed. In each case, the U.S. military was accused of cover 
up and the incidents were portrayed in the media as scandals. Selecting crisis 
communication failures for study uncovered systemic quirks in the past implementations 
of the military's crisis communication program. Starting with the 1968 My Lai massacre 
in Vietnam, to the 1994 friendly fire Black Hawk shootdown during Operation Provide 
Comfort, and ending with 2004 Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, these cases were analyzed to assess the military's wartime crisis 
communication strategies. Technological advancements and military culture were 
integrated in the analysis. 
The literature review begins with a review of contemporary crisis communication 
literature, which includes Horsley and Barker's (2002) synthesis model of public sector 
crisis communication. In addition, Hallahan's (1999) public relations view of framing 
theory, Gandy's (1982) information subsidies theory, the ethical proactive public 
relations model by Baker and Martinson (2001), and Hill's (1984) analysis of military 
authoritarianism round out the theoretical framework. 
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Based upon the communication theories highlighted in the literature review, a 
study was performed to research the military's crisis communications program and 
historical evolution of its crisis communication strategy. The researcher qualitatively 
analyzed training materials, regulations, historical documents, and interview transcripts to 
evaluate the military's current crisis communication program. Interviews with current 
and former military public affairs personnel provided context to the insights gained from 
researching training and regulation documentation. Ethics were also explored during the 
interviews and document analysis. Through performing interviews and document 
analysis, the researcher answered the following questions: 1) How does the military's 
crisis communication program compare with the synthesis model? 2) When the military 
experienced past crises, how did it communicate to the public and what were the effects? 
3) Did the military ethically deliberate public communications during crises? and 4) How 
do military culture and environmental factors affect its crisis communications and media 
relations? 
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CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The improved speed of communication increases the vulnerability of an 
organization to a crisis situation, and the modern media are able to bridge the distance 
between the crisis epicenter and millions of people all over the world (Koster & Politis-
Norton, 2004). Crisis media coverage has become more aggressive, frequent, and 
widespread, which increases the imperative for organizations to implement crisis 
communication programs. Horsley and Barker's (2002) synthesis model is this study's 
foundation for researching the military's crisis communication program. Other 
communication theories that enrich the study of crisis communication are included in the 
literature review: framing by Entman (1993) and Hallahan (1999), information subsidies 
by Gandy (1982), and Baker and Martinson's (2001) five principles for ethical public 
relations. Hill's (1984) look at military culture adds context to the study of military crisis 
communications. 
Crisis Communication 
The public relations practitioner performs a service during crisis by educating and 
informing the public, according to Froehlich and Rudiger (2005). Their job is to 
communicate with various publics, which are specific audiences that are targeted by 
communication products and programs (Fearn-Banks, 1996). The public relations 
practitioner targets specific audiences to manage and sustain the reputation of the 
represented client. Fearn-Banks said public relations practitioners do not control the 
image of an organization—instead they communicate in an effort to improve or maintain 
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its image. All too often reputation management is out of the practitioner's hands because 
organizations do not consider using public relations until they are in crisis (Fearn-Banks). 
Crisis Communication Defined 
Every organization must be prepared to face a crisis situation. A crisis is an 
unexpected major event that has the potential to end in a negative outcome for an 
organization and its employees, financial situation, and reputation (Koster & Politis-
Norton, 2004). Communicating strategically and proactively to the global audience is 
vital to an organization's survival during a crisis situation. A crisis begins with a 
surprising trigger event that signals its onset, and the crisis state will continue unless 
there is some sort of resolution (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). 
According to Coombs (2007), a crisis affects the perceived reputation of an 
organization. The crisis violates stakeholders' expectations of the organization. "When 
the expectations are breached, stakeholders perceive the organization less positively: the 
reputation is harmed" (Coombs, p. 3). To help mitigate the harm done to an 
organization's reputation during a crisis, public relations practitioners employ crisis 
management principles. According to Fearn-Banks (1996), "Crisis management is a 
process of strategic planning for a crisis or negative turning point, a process that removes 
some of the risk and uncertainty from the negative occurrence and thereby allows the 
organization to be in greater control of its own destiny" (p. 2). Coombs said crisis 
management has four interrelated factors: prevention, preparation, response, and revision. 
Crisis management employs a set of strategic actions that requires the involvement of an 
entire organization, whereas crisis communications encompasses the stakeholder 
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communications before, during, and after a crisis (Fearn-Banks). According to Fearn-
Banks, the communications are designed to uphold the positive image of the organization 
under crisis. 
Synthesis Model for Crisis Communication in the Public Sector 
According to Horsley and Barker (2002), very little literature was available about 
public sector crisis communication. In response to this lack of information, the 
researchers studied private industry crisis communication literature to extrapolate a 
model for public sector crisis communication. In the literature, Horsley and Barker found 
existing structures for the model, and their proposed model was a synthesis of these 
structures. The synthesis model of public sector crisis communication is "an arrangement 
linking processes and communication activities that organizations can use to prepare for 
and manage potential crisis communication events" (Horsley & Barker, p. 416). The 
model includes six stages: ongoing public relations efforts, identification of and 
preparation for potential crises, internal training and rehearsal, crisis event, evaluation 
and revision of public relations efforts, and interagency coordination and political 
analysis. These steps provide a useful framework that public agencies can use to develop 
a carefully organized and thought out plan for dealing with a crisis (Horsley & Barker). 
Step one: Ongoing public relations efforts. The first step of executing ongoing 
public relations efforts includes proactive public outreach and practitioner-journalist 
relationship building (Horsley & Barker, 2002). It is beneficial for a public relations 
practitioner to develop relationships with the media to ensure that the media will accept 
the framed information offered by the practitioner during crisis. If the organization does 
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not pursue public relations opportunities and outreach during the good times, it can haunt 
the organization during crisis when the support of the media and public is most needed. 
Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt (1995) noted that the best way to avoid negative 
media coverage during crisis is to engage in reputation enhancing, socially responsible 
activities. An organization that has the reputation for openness and honesty going into a 
crisis brings that reputation into its initial meetings with the media (Martinelli & Briggs, 
1998). In Fortunato's (2000) study of the National Basketball Association's public 
relations program, he noted that the NBA constantly worked to build relationships with 
reporters because when a crisis hits, the reporters will work to get the organization's side 
of the story. 
Step two: Identification of and preparation for potential crises. The second step 
of the synthesis model is the identification of and preparation for potential crises. 
According to Fearn-Banks (1996), determining probable crises could pinpoint problems 
that can be fixed before the crisis hits. The public relations practitioner must work with 
the entire organization to identify and prepare for potential crisis (Fearn-Banks). Every 
organization must accordingly plan for the swift and ethical handling of crisis situations 
(Martinelli & Briggs, 1998). It doesn't matter how large the organization - every 
organization benefits from a crisis communication plan. Fearn-Banks said a crisis 
communication plan should be included with the company-wide crisis management plan. 
If the company doesn't have a crisis management plan, a crisis communication plan is 
still needed. 
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Step three: Internal training and rehearsal. The third step of the synthesis model 
is internal training and rehearsal. Team members learn roles, train, and practice a crisis 
communication plan during this step (Horsley & Barker, 2002). Horsley and Barker 
noted that when formulating a crisis communication team and identifying potential 
threats, an organization must be certain that everyone involved has the same 
understanding of the procedures. Once the plan is developed and the teams are formed, 
crisis response procedures should be tested, often through simulated crisis drills or 
regular procedural reviews with management (Martinelli & Briggs, 1998). 
Internal culture often dictates how well the organization will follow a crisis 
communication plan during crisis. Research has shown that organizations with crisis 
plans do not always manage crises well (Marra, 1998). If an organization does not have a 
communication philosophy that supports the attributes necessary for excellent crisis 
public relations, it is likely a crisis plan will not work (Marra). 
According to Marra (1998), communication autonomy is the amount of power and 
responsibility an organization gave its public relations staff. Many practitioners work 
fervently to produce a crisis communication plan that is destined for failure because the 
strategies contradict the dominant and accepted organizational communication 
philosophies (Marra). Without communication autonomy, public relations practitioners 
are prevented from using communication techniques that reduce the negative effects of 
crisis. Horsley and Barker (2002) said that organizations whose workers have strong 
communication skills and understand their role in a crisis could win a public relations 
battle, especially if the battle is played out in an atmosphere of continuous proactive 
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communication. Agency leaders must support flexibility in public relations efforts and a 
philosophy of open communication (Horsley & Barker). 
Step four: The crisis event. The fourth step, the crisis event, is the apex of the 
synthesis model. Through the use of the media, prompt and resolute communication can 
help quell rumors and speculation during a crisis, especially when the situation involves 
public fear and uncertainty (Horsley & Barker, 2002). Horsley and Barker said that the 
crisis must be resolved in an ethical and human manner. Drumheller and Benoit (2004) 
noted that in cases where the offending person could apologize and help set things 
straight, he or she should be encouraged to do so because it's ethical and image 
enhancing. 
According to Horsley and Barker (2002), crisis action teams must be prepared to 
communicate with the public immediately after a crisis; offering no comment or waiting 
to address the media at a later time when more information is known could be detrimental 
to a company's image. In any type of crisis situation, an organization can benefit from a 
proactive strategy to work with the press rather than wait for the press to flood it with 
questions and speculation (Horsley & Barker). According to Kauffman (2005), an 
organization must be the controlling source of information during a crisis. If a company 
isn't proactive with its crisis communication strategy, an information vacuum is created 
and the media will obtain information elsewhere (Kauffman). "Often, the sources of 
information from which the media receives its information are not well informed, may 
have a negative opinion of the organization, may have an alternative perspective, or may 
speculate about the causes of the crisis" (Kauffman, p. 266). According to Kauffman, 
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when a crisis begins, the organization probably lacks reliable information, but it's 
important not to speculate. Speculation can cause legal problems for the organization by 
hampering crisis-related investigations. 
Step five: Evaluation and revision of public relations efforts. After a crisis 
communication event has passed, lessons learned must be recorded to evaluate and revise 
future communication efforts (Horsley & Barker, 2002). Martin and Boynton (2005) 
compared NASA's crisis communication effectiveness of the 1986 Challenger and 2003 
Columbia space shuttle disasters and analyzed media coverage of the communication 
efforts. Articles reflected that after the Columbia disaster, NASA used more proactive 
communication, made top-ranking executives more active with the media, had fewer 
anonymous sources speak to the media, and was more open, accessible, and prepared 
when compared to the Challenger disaster. The study highlighted the importance of 
learning from past crises, and making sure what is learned sticks (Martin & Boynton). 
Step six: Interagency coordination and political analysis. In the final step of the 
synthesis model, public sector organizations must ensure that all parties communicate the 
correct message to intended audiences (Horsley & Barker, 2002). Horsley and Barker 
noted that the first five steps of the synthesis model were developed from private industry 
literature, but they formulated a government-tailored sixth step for interagency 
coordination and political analysis. Interagency coordination allows government 
agencies to use available resources from other state agencies or local governments 
because agencies may need to combine their crisis communication efforts with other 
agencies that share the same types of potential crises (Horsley & Barker). The 
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researchers also said that political analysis is an important part of the model because 
changes in political leadership affect the climate, budget, and priorities of government 
agencies. 
Framing 
Framing the news could influence the public evaluation of an organization during 
a crisis; therefore, understanding the framing process is extremely beneficial for the 
public relations practitioner (Cho & Gower, 2006). Entman said, "To frame is to select 
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, 
in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (1993, p. 52). 
Frames can define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest 
remedies (Entman). Influencing the way a crisis is framed is important because the frame 
determines how people understand and remember a problem, as well as how they 
evaluate and choose to act upon it (Entman). 
Hallahan (1999) noted that framing is essential to public relations practitioners, 
especially during crisis, because practitioners operate as frame strategists: they attempt to 
determine how situations, attributes, choices, actions, issues, and responsibilities should 
be presented to achieve favorable outcomes for clients. According to Hallahan, there are 
multiple types of frames a practitioner could use to achieve success in representing a 
client during crisis. One important framing method is news framing. "The crisis 
manager must be concerned with packaging information about the event and the 
organization's response to shape media coverage, based on knowledge of how media 
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cover events of this type and culturally resonating themes that will garner public favor" 
(Hallahan, p. 229). When formulating how to package or frame crisis information, the 
public relations practitioner must select key target audiences and accordingly tailor the 
information. If the key audiences aren't identified, the framed information won't have 
salience with the audience. Successfully framed content provides context to key target 
audiences, which allows them to evaluate crisis information, comprehend meanings, and 
if necessary, take action (Hallahan). 
Hertog and McLeod (2001) said that organizations could make deliberate attempts 
to structure public discourse in ways that privilege their goals and means of attaining 
them. The researchers labeled this framing concept as "elite manipulation." The public 
relations practitioner must understand the power of framing during crisis because the 
organization has the ability to define the debate without the audience realizing it 
(Tankard, 2001). "Media framing can be likened to the magician's sleight of hand— 
attention is directed to one point so that people do not notice the manipulation that is 
going on at another point" (Tankard, p. 97). The public relations practitioner doesn't 
have the ability to influence the frame solely based upon word choice. The practitioner 
must establish relationships with the media to increase the probability that the crisis will 
be framed from the organization's point-of-view. 
Information Subsidies 
The interaction of the public relations practitioner with the news media is crucial 
in directing attention toward particular matters during a crisis (Esrock, Hart, D'Silva, & 
Werking, 2002). If a practitioner does not provide a journalist with information, the 
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journalist will find the information elsewhere. A reliable working relationship ensures 
the transfer of information between the practitioner and journalist, which is crucial for 
successful framing. Supplying the mass media with information gives the practitioner 
partial control of the news storyline, which is important as a means of swaying public 
opinion (Fortunate, 2005). 
Gandy (1982) introduced the information subsidy concept. According to Gandy, 
the information subsidy is the act of controlling access to information to produce 
influence over the action of others. The information is a subsidy because the source gives 
the information to the reporter at a lower cost (Gandy). Essentially, the organizational 
constraints of the news business pressure the reporter to produce stories under strict 
deadlines. The public relations practitioner eases the pressure by supplying information 
via pitches, press releases, media events, or press conferences (Gandy). A reporter will 
disregard a public relations practitioner who writes substandard press releases or supplies 
useless information (Gandy). But the practitioner who continually supplies quality 
information that is newsworthy is assured a positive relationship with the reporter 
(Gandy). Gandy noted that practitioners who have proved their value are selected over 
those who are either unknown or have reduced their worth by providing false or unusable 
information. 
The journalist doesn't automatically publish information supplied by the 
practitioner. Gandy said that journalists have the need to produce stories that will be 
published, so they utilize subsidized information that is of a type and form that will be 
published. Pan and Kosicki (2001) noted that in addition to lowering the cost of 
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information gathering for the journalist, the source must also generate cultural resonance 
of the frame with journalistic news values. Hallahan (1999) also said that journalism 
market models suggested that journalists purposefully framed stories in ways that 
resonated with what journalists perceived to be the largest segment of their audience. 
When framing a message, the public relations practitioner should be cognizant of cultural 
themes, market considerations, and the journalist's perception of audience needs. 
The perceived power of the source also plays a role in the information subsidy 
transaction. Journalists have a tendency to frame news favorably toward the source 
regarded as powerful or popular (Entman, 2007). Journalists who attributed greater 
influences of public relations on the news valued public relations more for granting them 
greater access to information and executive spokespersons that they could not obtain on 
their own (Sallot & Johnson, 2006). In a study of the media coverage surrounding the 
Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal, Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston (2006) said that 
news frames, particularly in matters of high consequence, were seriously constrained by 
mainstream news organizations' acquiescence to political power. An example of elite 
framing during a crisis was the embedding of journalists with combat troops in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. Embedded journalists were given full access to combat operations and 
the opportunity to experience the war like a member of the military (Haigh, et al., 2006). 
Researchers in the study found that newspaper coverage of embedded reporters was 
significantly more positive toward the military than those of nonembedded reporters. 
The military used its monopoly over access to its advantage, but also formed positive 
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relations with the reporters during the embedding process that consequently influenced 
the framing of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
Shin and Cameron (2005) conducted a study of the public relations practitioner 
and reporter relationship. Misconceptions by journalists and public relations practitioners 
toward one another have caused conflict (Shin & Cameron). According to the 
researchers, studies corroborated the existence of discord, misunderstanding, and 
perceptual difference as sources of conflict. Based on the results of the study, the 
researchers concluded that both professions were apprehensively interdependent with 
their roles in the news-making process because of their perceived incompatible goals of 
advocacy and objectivity. 
If a public relations practitioner provides false or useless information, tensions 
between the news and public relations profession become strained and the probability of 
an information subsidy transaction decreases (Gandy, 1982). A positive practitioner-
reporter relationship can increase the probability of controlling the frame of a crisis 
situation, but the relationship is ruined if ethical norms are violated. 
Ethically Proactive Public Relations 
Pauly and Hutchison (2005) said that financial and legal considerations often 
trump the concern for moral reputation of an organization in crisis. However, according 
to Bowen (2005), the public relations practitioner should be well versed in ethics because 
the practitioner is the ethical conscience of the organization. Because of the inevitable 
role of ethical deliberation in public relations, and above all, crisis communications, 
Baker and Martinson (2001) constructed a framework of ethical principles to assist public 
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relations practitioners in practical moral reasoning. Baker and Martinson's ethically 
proactive public relations model is referred to as TARES, which is an acronym for five 
action-guiding principles: "truthfulness" of the message, "authenticity" of the persuader, 
"respect" for the persuadee, "equity" of the persuasive appeal, and "social responsibility" 
for the common good. Baker and Martinson said that the principles together contain an 
ethical objective that allows practitioners to establish moral boundaries for specific 
persuasive public relations efforts. 
Truthfulness 
First and foremost, for any public relations communication to be ethical, it must 
be truthful (Baker & Martinson, 2001). A highly visible case of deceptive crisis 
communication was the Firestone tire scandal. Firestone attempted to conceal and 
deceive the public regarding the company's role in selling defective tires. The Firestone 
crisis communication actions demonstrated that denial was a deceptive response to a 
wrongful action, and if corrective action had been implemented immediately, deaths and 
injuries could have been avoided (Blaney, Benoit, & Brazeal, 2002). Truthfulness is 
essential to ethical framing because institutions and individuals will lose respect and 
confidence when they deceive, misinform, or confuse (Public Relations Society of 
America, 2005). 
Authenticity 
Practitioners must imbue authenticity, which is the second principle of TARES. 
Baker and Martinson (2001) grouped related issues to help define authenticity: integrity, 
personal virtue, sincerity, genuineness, loyalty, and independence. To test authenticity, 
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practitioners must ask themselves whether they believe others will benefit if they accept 
the persuasive message (Baker & Martinson). The crucial litmus test for authenticity is 
whether the practitioner is willing to publicly and personally be identified as the 
persuader in a particular situation (Baker & Martinson). 
Respect 
The third principle is respect, a central component of the TARES test (Baker & 
Martinson, 2001). "The Principle of Respect for the Persuadee is at the heart of the 
TARES Test, and is the underlying foundation and motivation for all of its other 
principles" (Baker & Martinson, p. 163). The practitioner must consider those recipients 
of the communication messages as persons of dignity who are owed respect by the very 
fact that they are human beings (Baker & Martinson). Practitioners should therefore 
augment the audience member's knowledge so the member can make an informed 
decision, according to Baker and Martinson. 
Equity 
The fourth principle is equity, another term for fairness, according to Baker and 
Martinson (2001). All audiences must be treated fairly, and practitioners must avoid 
creating persuasive messages that play upon the vulnerabilities of particular audiences 
(Baker & Martinson). The researchers said that practitioners should consider whether 
there is uniformity between themselves and the persuaders in terms of information, 
understanding, insight, capacity, and experience. 
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Social Responsibility 
The last principle in the TARES test is social responsibility. According to Baker 
and Martinson (2001), ethically proactive practitioners find ways to make positive 
contributions to the common good. Public relations practitioners have the ultimate 
opportunity to frame issues in a mutually beneficial manner for their organizations and 
stakeholders (Lundy, 2006). Striking a balance between legal and social responsibilities 
is difficult for public relations practitioners because lawyers' crisis response strategies 
and those of public relations practitioners often differ (Arpan & Pompper, 2003). 
According to Martinelli and Briggs (1998), communicating openly during crisis not only 
has the potential to affect public opinion favorably and build the organization's 
credibility with the media, but it also creates more difficulty for lawyers trying to defend 
an organization during a lawsuit. 
According to Baker and Martinson (2001), there is a danger that public relations 
practitioners will often play a dysfunctional role in society. Ethically deficient public 
relations practices ultimately generate public outrage, so it is imperative that ethics are 
considered when developing crisis communication strategies and responses. But it isn't 
only the responsibility of the public relations practitioner to adhere to ethically proactive 
public relations. According to Baker and Martinson, "It is the broader working place 
culture of the persuasive professions that is the major problem, and not so much the 
individual acts - however reprehensible they may be - of particular practitioners" (p. 
156). The military often faces ethical dilemmas during crisis because openness can 
negatively effect operational security or disclose classified information. The military has 
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been accused of covering up embarrassing crisis situations because of its propensity to 
classify information. 
Wartime Crisis Communication 
During war, the military has always viewed the media with skepticism because of 
professional and cultural differences. Going back to the Revolutionary War, the military 
has also used the media to communicate with the public. George Washington was the 
first military combat correspondent (Defense Information School, 2005f). From the 
battlefront, he wrote truthful articles - both negative and positive - to the colonists to 
retain their support (Defense Information School). During World War II, General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower said, "I believe the old saying 'public opinion wins wars' is true. 
Our countries fight best when our people are best informed" (Defense Information 
School, p. 26). 
Because war is inherently chaotic on a massive scale, unintended crisis events 
often occur. The three cases selected for review in this study were wartime crises that 
harmed the image of the U.S. military because they were avoidable. The first scandal 
outlined is the 1968 My Lai massacre in Vietnam, the second is the 1994 Black Hawk 
friendly fire shootdown during Operation Provide Comfort, and the last event is the 2004 
Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
Vietnam War 
The relationship between the media and the military during the Vietnam War was 
decisively strained. The military did not censor the media, but instead excessively 
classified information to cover up the negative progress of the war (Defense Information 
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School, 2005f). This tactic had serious limitations because reporters were on the 
battlefield witnessing the truth. The military briefings were called the "Five O'Clock 
Follies" because the reporters were aware of the stark disconnect between the truth and 
what the government was saying (Defense Information School). The My Lai massacre 
was first reported as an Army success by the government, but the truth was eventually 
uncovered. 
In 1967 Charlie Company arrived in Vietnam as one of the three Army companies 
belonging to Task Force Barker. Captain Ernest Medina led Charlie Company, and its 
mission was to pressure enemy forces in the Quang Ngai region (Linder, 1999). One of 
the platoon leaders was 24-year-old Lieutenant William Calley. At 8:00 a.m. March 16, 
1968, the men embarked on a mission to the My Lai 4 hamlet with the "usual search-and-
destroy task of pulling people from homes, interrogating them, and searching for Viet 
Cong" (Linder). Soon after the operation commenced, the American soldiers executed a 
group of older women who were kneeling and praying near the village temple. Calley 
was also at a drainage ditch on the eastern edge of the village. Approximately 80 men, 
women, and children were held there, and Calley ordered his platoon members to push 
the people into the ditch (Linder). Calley then ordered his men to shoot into the ditch. 
Some soldiers refused to follow his orders, and others obeyed. 
An Army photographer, Sergeant Ronald Haeberle, arrived on scene to document 
a significant encounter with the Viet Cong, but instead witnessed approximately 30 
different soldiers kill about 100 civilians (Linder, 1999). An Army helicopter flown by 
Chief Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson arrived in the My Lai vicinity at approximately 
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9:00 a.m. (Linder). He landed his helicopter and told Calley to hold his men there as he 
evacuated the civilians. Thompson told his helicopter crew chief to shoot the Americans 
if they fired at the civilians, and then reported the civilian killings to brigade headquarters 
(Linder). 
Twenty months after the massacre, Army investigators discovered three mass 
graves containing the bodies of about 500 villagers (Linder, 1999). Immediately 
following the My Lai massacre, official Army reports of the operation proclaimed a 
triumphant victory (Linder). Thompson filed a complaint that alleged numerous war 
crimes committed by Charlie Company soldiers. Consequently, a quick and informal 
investigation was completed that concluded Americans had unintentionally killed only 20 
civilians (Linder). A reconnaissance soldier who was stationed in Due Pho, Ronald 
Ridenhour, heard five eyewitness accounts of the My Lai massacre, and he began his own 
informal investigation. After Ridenhour was discharged from the military in 1969, he 
composed a letter detailing what he heard about the My Lai massacre. Letters were 
mailed to President Richard Nixon, the Pentagon, the State Department, and numerous 
members of Congress (Linder). The letter caught the attention of two officials -
Democratic Representatives Morris Udall from Arizona and L. Mendel Rivers from 
South Carolina (Hersh, 1970). Both men pressured the military to investigate the 
allegations, and the Army Inspector General was soon assigned to the case (Hersh). The 
Army Inspector General started investigating the case in April 1969, and on September 5, 
formal charges were filed against Calley (Linder). November 1969 the American public 
learned more details of what allegedly happened at My Lai 4. The massacre was the 
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cover story in both Time and Newsweek; CBS ran a Mike Wallace interview with one of 
the My Lai soldiers; Seymour Hersh published in-depth articles; and Life magazine 
published Haeberle's graphic photographs (Linder). 
Most of the men who committed the crimes no longer served in the military, so 
they were immune from prosecution by military court-martial (Linder, 1999). The top 
officer charged, Major General Samuel Koster, had the charges against him dropped and 
received only a letter of censure and reduction in rank. November 12, 1970, Calley's 
court martial began (Linder). The defense argued that the stress of combat greatly 
impaired Calley's thinking, and that he was following orders from his company 
commander, Captain Medina. After thirteen days of deliberation, the jury found Calley 
guilty of premeditated murder on all counts, and was sentenced to life imprisonment 
(Linder). November 9, 1974, the Secretary of the Army announced that Calley was to be 
paroled. Linder (1999) said that the negative media reaction to the My Lai massacre 
shifted support away from the Vietnam War. "Two weeks after the Calley verdict was 
announced, the Harris Poll reported for the first time that a majority of Americans 
opposed the war in Viet Nam" (Linder, p. 10). 
Operation Provide Comfort 
In the 1990s, the military was still recovering from the harm done to its image in 
the Vietnam War. "The lack of confidence Americans held for the military took over a 
quarter-century to dissolve and the military's victory in the Persian Gulf War finally put 
to rest that lack of confidence" (English, 2005, p. 11). The military also had to adapt to 
advances in media technology. CNN was a force to be reckoned with during the Gulf 
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War - the network provided 24-hour news coverage (Defense Information School, 2005f, 
p. 46). After the Gulf War, CAW continued to influence the military's communication 
tactics. 
April 14, 1994, two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and their crews assigned 
to Operation Provide Comfort were transporting American, United Kingdom, French, and 
Turkish military officers; Kurdish representatives; and a U.S. political advisor in northern 
Iraq (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1997). According to Piper (2000), they 
took off in the morning from Pirinclik, near Diyarbakir, Turkey, and were headed for the 
Operation Provide Comfort military coordination center located in Zakhu, Iraq. 
Operation Provide Comfort was a U.S. coalition operation that provided protection and 
humanitarian aid to Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq (Piper). 
Before departing southern Turkey, the two helicopter pilots activated the "friend-
or-foe system," that was designed to identify them to other U.S. aircraft (Thompson, 
1995). The pilots set it to a frequency that was listed in the secret air-tasking order they 
received from the U.S. Air Force each day. While the Black Hawks were departing, an 
Air Force Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft was flying over 
Turkey to provide airborne threat warning and control for Operation Provide Comfort 
aircraft, including the Black Hawk helicopters (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
1997). Almost an hour after taking off, the Black Hawks reported their entry into the no-
fly zone to the AWACS en-route controller, Lieutenant Joseph Halcli, and landed six 
minutes later at their destination in Iraq (Piper, 2000). 
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Halcli and Captain Jim Wang, the AWACS crew's senior director, added friendly 
helicopter symbology to their radars, but then suspended the symbology after the Black 
Hawks landed at the control center (Piper). The helicopters took off shortly thereafter 
and reported their departure, flight route, and destination to Halcli. Halcli again placed 
symbology on his radar screen to show the two Black Hawks. He notified Wang of the 
helicopters' movement, and the friendly helicopter symbology was visible on the radar 
screens of Wang and two other AWACS officers (Piper). Twenty minutes after their 
departure, the Black Hawks entered mountainous terrain and their radar returns 
disappeared from the AWACS radars. Captain Dierdre Bell, an air surveillance officer 
on the AWACS, noticed that the radar returns had disappeared and sent an electronic 
warning to Wang's scope, but he took no action and the warning disappeared from his 
screen after one minute (Piper). 
Two U.S. F-15 fighter jets piloted by Captain Eric Wickson and Lieutenant 
Colonel Randy May took off from another Turkish base the same day, bound for the no-
fly zone where the Black Hawks were flying (Piper, 2000). Their mission was to perform 
a sweep of the no-fly zone to clear the area of any hostile aircraft. They also had an air-
tasking order, but were told to set their friend-or-foe system to a frequency different from 
the Black Hawks (Thompson, 1995). Wickson, the lead pilot, radioed Lieutenant Ricky 
Wilson in the AWACS, who was responsible for the air traffic inside the no-fly zone, and 
asked if there was any information to pass to them (Piper). Wilson said there was no 
information. Wilson thought that the Black Hawks had landed again, and asked Wang if 
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he could drop the friendly helicopter symbology from their scopes. The request was 
approved (Piper). 
When the fighters saw two helicopters on their radar screens, their electronic 
systems failed to identify the helicopters (Thompson, 1995). Wickson reported the 
presence of the unidentified helicopters to the AW ACS. Wilson acknowledged his report 
but responded that he had no radar contacts in that area. Both F-15 pilots electronically 
pinged the radar target with their on-board identification friend or foe system, and it came 
back negative (Piper, 2000). The two F-15s then initiated a visual identification pass of 
the unidentified aircraft, and Wickson reported to Wilson in the AW ACS that the two 
aircraft were Iraqi helicopters. Wilson asked Wang if he heard the reports and he 
answered yes, but did not offer any guidance or additional information (Piper). The two 
F-15s circled around the helicopters once more, and notified the AWACS that they were 
ready to fire. The AWACS told them to go ahead and fire. 
Wickson fired a missile at the trail helicopter - the missile hit and destroyed the 
helicopter seconds later (Piper, 2000). The lead helicopter immediately turned and dove 
in an attempt to evade the attack. May then fired another missile at the lead helicopter, 
and successfully shot it down (Piper). All 26 personnel on board the two helicopters 
were killed. According to Piper, after flying over the wreckage of the helicopters, May 
radioed Wickson, "Stick a fork in them, they're done" (p. 34). Kurdish civilians notified 
the Operation Provide Comfort mission control center about the shootdown, and CNN 
thus broadcast the news that a friendly fire incident had occurred in Northern Iraq (Piper). 
President Bill Clinton expressed his condolences to the coalition countries that had 
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personnel killed in the fratricide, and said, "We will get the facts, and we will make them 
available to the American people and to the people of Britain, France, and Turkey, our 
partners in Operation Provide Comfort" (Piper, p. 56). 
The Air Force immediately convened an accident investigation board, which was 
composed of a board president; 11 board members from the U.S. military; three associate 
members from France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom; four legal advisors; and 13 
technical advisors (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1997). After interviewing 
more than 100 witnesses and conducting numerous tests, the investigation results were 
publicly released July 13, 1994. Anonymous defense officials had leaked some of the 
investigation findings to the media two weeks earlier. The investigation concluded that 
the F-15 pilots misidentified the Black Hawks, the AWACS crew failed to intervene, the 
Black Hawks and their operations were not integrated into the Task Force, and the friend-
or-foe systems failed (Piper, 2000). 
Wang was the only officer charged in the case, and his court-martial began in 
May 1995 at Tinker Air Force Base, OK (Piper, 2000). June 20, 1995, the Air Force 
announced a nullification verdict (refusal to convict on the stated charges) that acquitted 
Wang of the charges. According to Thompson, Wang's acquittal meant that no Air Force 
officer faced anything but a mild administrative penalty (1995). The families of the 
personnel killed in this fratricide event were livid that the Air Force personnel involved 
with the shootdown did not receive stiffer punishments (Piper). The family members 
publicly accused the military of covering up to protect themselves. 
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Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Operation Iraqi Freedom was controversial from its inception, but the U.S. 
military went on the public affairs offensive to win the "hearts and minds" of the global 
audience. Reporters embedded with ground units to publicize the tactical view of battle. 
"The press had access, the media got the military story to the public, and those members 
of the media that violated the ground rules were not allowed to report the story" (Sieber, 
2007, p. 51). According to English (2005), retired general officers contracted with the 
news networks actively liaised with the military. The positive results gained from the 
proactive public outreach were futile when photographs of the Abu Ghraib prison abuses 
were made public. 
CBS and The New Yorker broke the story in April 2004: American soldiers were 
caught on film abusing Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib military prison in Iraq. The 
case made international headlines, and according to Hersh, in one photograph, " Private 
England, a cigarette dangling from her mouth, is giving a jaunty thumbs-up sign and 
pointing at the genitals of a young Iraqi, who is naked except for a sandbag over his head, 
as he masturbates" (2004, para. 8). 
The world found out about the abuses because of Specialist Joseph Darby. He 
had received a compact disc from Corporal Charles Graner, which had hundreds of 
pictures of naked detainees (Hersh, 2004). Initially he submitted an anonymous letter to 
the Army's Criminal Investigation Division, but later came forward and gave a sworn 
statement. In the fall of 2003, the senior commander in Iraq, Lieutenant General Ricardo 
Sanchez, ordered the Army's chief law-enforcement officer, Major General Marshal 
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Donal Ryder, to review the prison system in Iraq and recommend ways to improve it 
(Hersh). Ryder's report concluded that there was a need for the establishment of 
interrogation procedures to define the role of military police soldiers, but the situation at 
Abu Ghraib was not yet a crisis (Hersh). 
January 2004 Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, commander of the 800th 
Military Police Brigade and in charge of Iraqi military prisons, was formally admonished 
and quietly suspended from command (Hersh, 2004). At the same time, a major 
investigation of the Army's prison system, authorized by Sanchez, was under way. An 
internal report written by Major General Antonio Taguba was completed in February 
2004 (Hersh). Taguba found that between October and December 2003 there were 
numerous instances of "sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses" at Abu Ghraib 
(Hersh, para. 4). 
Taguba revealed that Karpinski signed reports calling for changes to procedures, 
but did nothing to ensure the orders were carried out (Hersh, 2004). Taguba also found 
that the soldiers were poorly prepared and trained. The accused soldiers claimed they 
weren't given any training guidelines for handling the detainees (Hersh). Soldiers 
repeatedly noted that the military intelligence teams were directing operations inside Abu 
Ghraib. The military police soldiers continued what they were doing without warning the 
chain-of-command because it appeared that military intelligence personnel approved of 
the abuse (Hersh). According to Hersh, Taguba recommended that Karpinski and seven 
brigade military police officers and enlisted men be relieved of command and formally 
reprimanded. According to Hersh, no criminal proceedings were suggested for Karpinski 
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because "apparently, the loss of promotion and the indignity of a public rebuke were seen 
as enough punishment" (para. 31). The U.S. Department of Defense removed seventeen 
soldiers and officers from duty, and seven soldiers were charged with dereliction of duty, 
maltreatment, aggravated assault, and battery (Mestrovic, 2007). 
Military Culture 
The U.S. military carries on various traditions that run counter to the customs of 
civilian life. According to Hill (1984), people tend to forget the basic differences that 
make comparisons between the military and civilian life, moot. The military is the only 
organization that has the responsibility to carry out the U.S. martial mission. This 
mission demands an authoritarian leadership style (Hill). According to Hill, the 
authoritarian nature of the military produced the following practices: chain-of-command, 
rapid decision-making, and uncritical acceptance of orders. Consequently, the military's 
authoritarianism conflicts with the America's democratic culture. Hill said, "Although 
many philosophical arguments could be addressed to this contract, people must conclude 
that the safety of American democracy depends on the effectiveness of our military" (p. 
49). 
To retain this effectiveness, the military leadership must employ the authoritarian 
leadership style. This is especially vital during war. The authoritarian leadership style 
also introduces the concept of command responsibility. The commanding officer has the 
responsibility of dispensing lawful orders to subordinates. With the power to order others 
comes accountability for the orders being given. The leader is consequently responsible 
for the actions of the subordinates. During Calley's court martial, he defended himself by 
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arguing that his leadership had command responsibility for his actions - he was following 
orders. 
Overview 
The literature review provided a summary of the theoretical and analytical 
research as it related to effective crisis communication practices. Horsley and Barker's 
(2002) guide for public sector crisis communication was reviewed as a model for 
effective government crisis communication. The synthesis model consists of six steps for 
public sector crisis communication: ongoing public relations, identification of and 
preparation for potential crises, internal training and rehearsal, the crisis event, evaluation 
and revision of public relations efforts, and interagency coordination and political 
analysis (Horsley and Barker). Within the internal training and rehearsal step, Marra's 
(1998) research on communication autonomy was integrated. According to Marra, public 
relations staffs must be granted the power and responsibility to effectively communicate 
an organization's message during crisis. 
The communication theories of framing, information subsidies, and ethically 
proactive public relations provided additional guidance for researching crisis 
communication practices. Framing research explicated why it's vital for public relations 
practitioners to use the media as an outlet for disseminating crisis communication 
messages. Depending on how the crisis message is publicized by the media, the frame 
will influence how people remember a problem (Entman, 1993). The public relations 
practitioner is the frame strategist, especially for an organization in crisis, so it's crucial 
30 
that public sector communicators understand the power of crafting and framing the news 
during crisis (Hallahan, 1999). 
The information subsidy enhances the ability for the public relations practitioner 
to frame the crisis message. Gandy (1982) noted that the pressure on a reporter to 
produce a story under strict deadline has allowed the public relations practitioner to make 
the reporter's job easier through the practitioner's ability to supply information. It's a 
give and take relationship that benefits both professions, and during crisis, the 
relationships and past subsidies are critical to how the message is framed. A public 
relations practitioner who has demonstrated value is selected over those who are either 
unknown or have reduced their value by providing worthless information (Gandy). 
Disregarding ethics during crisis not only hurts the ability for the practitioner to 
provide an information subsidy to the reporter, but it also impacts the organization's 
credibility. Baker and Martinson (2001) created the TARES test for ethically proactive 
public relations. The researchers said that TARES was an important model for a 
practitioner in weighing the moral implications and consequences of persuasive framing 
from the perspective of their client, society, and the practitioner's own integrity. 
Three highly publicized and criticized wartime crisis communication cases were 
outlined in the literature review: the 1968 My Lai massacre in Vietnam, the 1994 Black 
Hawk friendly fire shootdown in Operation Provide Comfort, and the 2004 Abu Ghraib 
prison abuse scandal in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The literature review concluded with a 
broad overview of U.S. military culture. According to Hill (1984), military leadership 
employs the authoritarian leadership style because it is necessary for the military to 
31 
remain effective during peace and war. The concepts of chain-of-command, rapid 
decision-making, and command responsibility were created from the authoritarian 
leadership style. 
Theoretical Framework for Study 
The research outlined in this literature review provided a theoretical framework 
for a study of the U.S. military's crisis communication program. Horsley and Barker's 
(2002) synthesis model for crisis communication bridges the gap between civilian and 
government crisis communication techniques. Horsley and Barker noted the differences 
between civilian and government crisis communication practices and created a model to 
reflect these perceived differences. The model was used as a baseline for analyzing the 
military's crisis communication program. 
Entman (1993) and Hallahan (1999) explained framing and why public relations 
practitioners must understand how media frames can affect the crisis outcome. The 
researcher analyzed the resulting media frames in each military crisis communications 
case study. Analyzing media frames facilitated the researcher's assessment of the 
military's past crisis communication efforts. 
The public relations practitioner should cultivate positive relationships with the 
media before a crisis hits through providing an information subsidy (Gandy, 1982). The 
researcher interviewed military public affairs personnel to gather first-hand observations 
of military-media relations. Baker and Martinson's (2001) TARES test for ethically 
proactive public relations was used to investigate the presence of ethical reasoning during 
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the three case studies. Hill's (1984) research on military culture gave additional context 
to the researcher's study of the military's crisis communication program. 
Research Questions 
Specifically, the following research questions were applied in this study: 
Research Question 1 
How does the military's crisis communication program compare with the 
synthesis model? 
Research Question 2 
When the military experienced past crises, how did it communicate with the 
public and what were the effects? 
Research Question 3 
Did the military ethically deliberate its communication strategy during the crises? 
Research Question 4 
How do military culture and environmental factors affect its crisis 
communications and media relations? 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
According to Fearn-Banks (1996), the qualitative case study is an insightful 
method for analyzing an organization's crisis communication program and 
communication practices during specific crisis events. The researcher utilized the 
qualitative case study and document research methodology for exploring the U.S. 
military's crisis communication program. The primary research sources were 
unclassified documents, news coverage, and interview transcripts. According to Koster 
and Politis-Norton (2004), a crisis is an unexpected major event that has the potential to 
end in a negative outcome for an organization and its employees, financial situation, and 
reputation. The U.S. military has experienced many crises during its history. The 
researcher focused on how the military plans for unexpected crisis events during wartime 
- the crisis within a larger crisis. How the military is trained to communicate with the 
public before, during, and after crisis were studied to better understand the military crisis 
communication program. 
Military Crisis Communication Program 
To help build the foundation for this study, the U.S. military's crisis 
communication program was thoroughly investigated through the analysis of unclassified 
military documents and interview transcripts. 
Document Analysis 
Through the textual analysis of military public affairs training documents, guides, 
and doctrine, the researcher gained an understanding of how military personnel are 
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trained and expected to respond to crisis events. The Defense Information School located 
at Fort Meade, MD, is the training school for all U.S. military public affairs personnel. 
On the school's Web site, publicly accessible training modules are posted. The 
researcher analyzed the training modules to know how military public affairs personnel 
are trained to handle crisis situations. Joint Publication 3-61 is the overarching guidance 
doctrine document for military public affairs. The researcher analyzed this document for 
crisis communication program data. Each military service has communication guides 
publicly available that were incorporated into the analysis. 
Interviews 
Depth interviews with current and former military public affairs personnel were 
performed to add context and personal observation to the data collected from the 
qualitative textual analysis. The researcher conducted structured interviewing because it 
directed the flow of the interview and facilitated interviewing via e-mail. The interviews 
addressed the following topics: interviewee military background, public affairs training, 
media relations experience, crisis communication experience, opinion of the military 
crisis communication program, technology, culture, and military ethics training. 
The researcher interviewed current and former military public affairs personnel 
who worked at various organizational levels. Interview participants were solicited 
through the researcher's established professional network. The researcher is a former Air 
Force public affairs officer and serves as a public affairs officer in the California Air 
National Guard. The researcher had access to former and current military public affairs 
personnel who fit the criteria outlined in the interview methodology. In addition, the 
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researcher's contacts had access to other military public affairs personnel who also 
participated in this study. The researcher interviewed military public affairs personnel 
who did not require higher headquarters permission to participate in this study. 
Eight public affairs personnel from the Army and Air Force who have served or 
currently serve in a headquarters position were interviewed to collect observations 
regarding the strategic view of military crisis communications, ethics, media relations, 
and the effect of technology on public communications during crisis. Coincidentally, the 
personnel all had deployment experience as well, which provided insight into the tactical 
perspective of military crisis communications. Questions concerning the effects of 
communication technology on media relations were addressed with all participants. 
Synthesis Model Comparison 
Horsley and Barker (2002) developed a crisis communication framework that 
government agencies, like the military, can use to successfully confront a crisis. Known 
as the synthesis model, it incorporates six stages: ongoing public relations efforts, 
identification of and preparation for potential crises, internal training and rehearsal, crisis 
event, evaluation and revision of public relations efforts, and interagency coordination 
and political analysis. The researcher compared the military's crisis communication 
training and regulations with the synthesis model to reveal whether the military's 
sanctioned practices emulate an established crisis communication model. 
Crisis Communication Case Studies 
The fact that U.S. taxpayers finance the military inherently increases the amount 
of public scrutiny the military faces during a crisis. The researcher analyzed three 
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military wartime crisis communication events to closely examine the military's past crisis 
communication responses. These cases include the 1968 My Lai massacre in Vietnam, 
the 1994 friendly fire Black Hawk shootdown in Operation Provide Comfort, and the 
2004 Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal in Operation Iraqi Freedom. These cases were 
chosen for study because they were crises; the cases span over four decades; and a 
plethora of publicly accessible documentation exists. The researcher also uncovered the 
cultural and technological evolution of military crisis communication. The evolution of 
the military's communication practices exposed positive and negative patterns that were 
interconnected with technological advances and military culture. 
Document Analysis 
The facts and events relating to each case were researched via historical 
documentation; studies; The New York Times articles, editorials, and opinion columns; 
unclassified government investigations; and U.S. military press conferences and news 
articles. The document analysis allowed the researcher to assess the military crisis 
communication responses to the three crisis events. The researcher used the framing 
literature (Entman, 1993; Hallahan, 1999) as a guide for analyzing the coverage resulting 
from the military's crisis communication efforts. Baker and Martinson's (2001) test for 
ethically proactive public relations provided a guide for assessing the ethical 
compunction of the military communicators during each crisis. The historical evolution 
of the military-media relationship was investigated via document analysis. The effects of 
technology on the military's crisis communication responses were integrated into the 
analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
Military Crisis Communication Program 
The U.S. military's crisis communication program refers to those characteristics 
common to the military's handling of various crises, training tools, and regulations. The 
researcher examined the military's basic public affairs training course and military 
regulations to investigate how the military's crisis communication program compares 
with the synthesis model. 
All U.S. military public affairs personnel receive crisis communication training, 
participate in practical exercises, and follow military regulations. Public affairs 
personnel are required to attend Defense Information School. The school is open to all 
military branches and provides instruction to officers and enlisted personnel. The 
mission of the school is to "grow and sustain a corps of professional organizational 
communicators who fulfill the communication needs of the military and government 
leaders and audiences" (Defense Information School, 2008). 
The Defense Information School basic officer's course, Public Affairs Qualification 
Course (PAQC), examines the philosophy of public relations, growth of technology and 
its effect on news delivery, and interviewing and reporting techniques. The course is 
divided into eight blocks of instruction that include introductory theories, practical 
exercises, case studies, and a field training exercise. The course is presented in a 
"progressive format, exposing students to essential foundational knowledge through a 
series of case studies, assigned readings, guided discussions, and practical applications" 
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(Defense Information School, 2003, p. 3). Within these blocks of instruction, crisis 
communication skills and ethics are also taught. "Each functional area stresses the 
requirement for defense public affairs leaders to maintain a high standard of integrity" 
(Defense Information School, p. 3). 
The PAQC curriculum originates from the military's overarching public affairs 
regulation, Joint Publication 3-61. The instruction provides guidance to military public 
affairs personnel (Department of Defense, 2005). It also informs commanders on how to 
communicate with domestic and global audiences. This regulation and service-level 
regulations are examined to research how the military crisis communication program 
compares to the synthesis model. The service-level regulations derive from Join? 
Publication 3-61, but are tailored for the differing missions of the military branches. 
For the purposes of organization, the analysis of the first research question is 
divided into six parts - each step of the synthesis model. These steps provide a useful 
framework that government agencies can use to develop a carefully organized and 
thought out plan for dealing with a crisis (Horsley & Barker, 2002). Within each step, 
the military regulations and PAQC instruction are examined to reveal whether each step 
of the synthesis model is addressed in the researched content. All materials researched 
were unclassified and downloaded from government Web sites. 
Step One: Ongoing Public Relations Efforts 
The first step of executing ongoing public relations efforts includes proactive 
public outreach and practitioner-journalist relationship building (Horsley & Barker, 
2002). The Department of Defense said that credibility with the media is built over time, 
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during good times and bad (2005). "At least once annually, major Navy and Marine 
Corps shore activities shall inform local news media representatives, civil defense, and 
law enforcement officials about standard plans to handle accidents and other emergencies 
and contingencies" (U.S. Navy, 2005, p. 97). This proactive outreach builds ties between 
the military, media, and local stakeholders, which will prove valuable once crisis hits. 
The authors of the military training curriculum noted the importance of 
cultivating positive relations between the military and media. "Successful relationships 
between the military and the media are primarily based upon credibility and trust. Such 
relationships are normally built over time, not during a crisis or combat situation" 
(Defense Information School, 2005g, p. 3). The instructors noted three central reasons 
why the public has a right to be informed about military activities: Americans pay taxes, 
which funds the military; informing the public is democratic; and the military relies on 
the media to tell the military story during war and peace (Defense Information School, 
2005c). 
Step Two: Identification of and Preparation for Potential Crises 
The second step of the synthesis model is the identification of and preparation for 
potential crises. The public relations practitioner must work with the entire organization 
to identify and prepare for potential crisis (Fearn-Banks, 1996). For every operation or 
crisis, the military develops public affairs guidance, which includes recommended 
themes, messages, and questions and answers (Department of Defense, 2005). 
"Coordination of overall themes and messages, as well as a plan to support media 
coverage, and all applicable public affairs guidance, should be approved prior to 
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hostilities in order to effectively shape the information environment" (Department of 
Defense, p. 39). According to the Army, public affairs guidance directs commanders and 
public affairs leaders in the application of public affairs doctrine and standard operating 
procedures on the battlefield (U.S. Army, 1997). In battle, public affairs personnel 
inherently face many challenges, such as expeditiously releasing truthful information. 
Combat operations "often place the PA leader in a difficult situation - one in which an 
overwhelming number of news media on the scene will seek answers to legitimate 
questions about unfolding events" (U.S. Army, p. 46). Planning for contingencies and 
the resulting media response is imperative for the military because it always receives 
international attention during military operations. 
The PAQC instructors taught students to cultivate relationships and plan for crisis 
with various base personnel, such as the safety officer, command post, and hospital 
commander. "Get to know the people who will play a role in most accidents or incident, 
and don't wait until you are in the midst of a situation to figure out who they are" 
(Defense Information School, 2005b, p. 5). 
Step Three: Internal Training and Rehearsal 
The third step of the synthesis model is internal training and rehearsal. Team 
members learn roles, train, and practice a crisis communication plan during this step 
(Horsley & Barker, 2002). The joint public affairs regulation is explicit about how vital 
it is to have public affairs participation in exercise planning, execution, and training. 
"Failure to include the PA staff and infrastructure in all aspects of an exercise could 
result in serious deficiencies in PA support during an actual operation" (Department of 
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Defense, 2005, p. 40). The scenarios should be more complex than outlining simple 
administrative procedures for hosting journalists (Department of Defense). A 
representative from the public affairs staff should be present during the exercise planning 
meetings so scenarios are realistic and not based from outside assumptions about public 
affairs tasks and procedures (Department of Defense). A mock exercise is the capstone 
of PAQC. Students are placed in a wartime scenario where they must use their training 
to respond to crisis events, such as plane crashes, suicides, fratricides, and collateral 
damage reports. Throughout the PAQC instruction, case studies are analyzed to assess 
the quality of the real world response. 
Media training is a vital tenet of crisis communication training and rehearsal 
because it helps prepare spokespersons to be ready for the media (Defense Information 
School, 2003). Students are media trained during PAQC, which included role-playing 
scenarios such as on camera stand-ups, talk shows, and press conferences. The students 
are also taught how to media train others. Periodic general media training for troops and 
subject matter experts must be performed because the people responsible for 
accomplishing the mission should be prepared to interact with the media (Defense 
Information School, 2005a). Training can be done anytime, and it's especially ideal 
during deployment training exercises. 
Hardball media role-playing is essential during mock interviews. "The tougher 
you are with them the more prepared they will be for the real thing. It will help everyone 
develop plans for responding to certain issues and validate their effectiveness" (Defense 
Information School, 2005a, p. 14). The PAQC instructors taught students how to media 
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train other personnel by putting the students through the training themselves. Mock 
stand-up interviews, press conferences, morning talk shows, and one-on-one interviews 
are all used as training tools. Students were videotaped so they could see how they 
performed. 
Step Four: The Crisis Event 
The fourth step, the crisis event, is the apex of the synthesis model. The Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs' "Principles of Information" guides the military's 
crisis communication efforts (see Appendix A). According to the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Public Affairs, it is Department of Defense policy to make accurate 
information timely to various publics; requests for information will be answered 
promptly; the Freedom of Information Act will be supported; publicized information will 
not be censored or include propaganda; information will not be overly classified to 
protect the government; and information will be withheld only when national security is 
at stake (Department of Defense, 2005). The Principles of Information apply during 
peace and war. 
The successful execution of wartime operations and crisis events depends on the 
credibility of information released by the military because deception undermines the 
support of the Armed Forces (Department of Defense, 2005). Honest, balanced, and 
timely information released during a crisis boosts the public's confidence and enhances 
the legitimacy of the military's actions. When news is negative or when a crisis hits, 
"attempting to deny unfavorable information or failing to acknowledge its existence leads 
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to media speculation, the perception of cover-up, and lost public trust" (Department of 
Defense, p. 18). 
The Air Force, Army, and Navy have regulations that provide guidance to public 
affairs personal and commanders on how to communicate with the public when a crisis 
hits. The service guidance stems from Joint Publication 3-61, but is tailored to the 
service's mission. According to the Air Force, "Experience proves candor is best. It may 
be big news for a day or two, but concealing bad news will keep it in the headlines 
longer. Public suspicion will linger indefinitely and future communication will be 
strained" (2006, p. 130). Air Force public affairs personnel are required to release bad 
news with minimum delay. The Air Force also noted that public affairs personnel must 
provide leaders with rapid counsel during crisis because ultimately the commanders 
decide what information is released (see Appendix B for list of Air Force crisis 
procedures). 
The Army takes a no-nonsense approach to crisis communications. "Army 
policies, decisions and actions will be criticized and praised. PAOs cannot control media 
coverage or guarantee positive media products" (1997, p. 18). The Army said 
spokespersons must avoid speculation; address successes, strengths, failures, and 
weaknesses; and explain corrective actions and preventative measures. If the Army 
refuses to comment on a crisis or withholds negative information, it creates speculation 
and allegations of cover up (U.S. Army). The Army also noted the counterpropaganda 
value of releasing timely and truthful information, "When intentional misinformation or 
disinformation efforts are being made by adversaries, providing open access and 
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independent media coverage is the most effective defense. It is a key tool for countering 
the impact of enemy information operations" (p. 18). 
A significant block of PAQC instruction is devoted to crisis media relations (See 
Appendix C for curriculum crisis response guidelines). Every student is required to 
participate in a mock news conference. The course emphasizes mastering the news 
conference for the following reasons: it focuses media attention, saves time, presents a 
uniform message, provides simultaneous release of information, and explains complex 
issues (Defense Information School, 2005d). Besides news conferences, various other 
crisis communication scenarios are practiced during the training. The training also 
addresses logistics and operational support to the media during war or crisis. The 
Defense Information School instructors said any media query or incident should be 
routed through various channels, which include the commander, staff judge advocate, 
security, personnel, other units, and higher headquarters (Defense Information School, 
2005b). 
The PAQC instruction integrates ethics training, public affairs personnel must 
define and apply ethical standards; and understand the ethical views of the country, unit, 
commander, and community (Defense Information School, 2005e, p. 10). The instruction 
covered six ethical foundations: professional ethics, the imperative of trust, professional 
privilege, social responsibility, positive aspects of socially responsible public relations, 
and negative aspects of socially responsible public relations (Defense Information 
School, p. 12). 
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Step Five: Evaluation and Revision of Public Relations Efforts 
After a crisis communication event has passed, lessons learned should be recorded 
to evaluate and revise future communication efforts (Horsley & Barker, 2002). In the 
military, lessons learned are often documented after crisis and war. Public affairs staff 
should record daily lessons learned and be prepared to report the observations in an after-
action report (Department of Defense, 2005). The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center 
operates the Center for Army Lessons Learned, which is dedicated to collecting and 
researching operational and training event data to produce lessons learned for military 
personnel (2007). Historical military papers, theses, and monographs that document 
crisis communication responses are stored in its online public archives. The Center for 
Army Lessons Learned Web site also linked to 28 additional military lessons learned 
Web sites (U.S. Army Combined Arms Center). 
Step Six: Interagency Coordination and Political Analysis 
In the final step of the synthesis model, government organizations must ensure 
that all parties communicate the correct message and that the message is reaching its 
intended audiences (Horsley & Barker, 2002). The stated need for consistent messaging 
was present in all of the military regulations examined in this study. "Commanders 
should ensure that DOD PA operations put forth a consistent message through its many 
voices. Information should be appropriately coordinated and in compliance with official 
DOD and supported command guidance before it is released to the public" (Department 
of Defense, 2005, p. 18). Coordinating with various government agencies is essential 
during crisis operations because the media is saturated with assorted messages from 
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different sources that are true and untrue (Department of Defense). The goal is for the 
U.S. military to be proactive rather than reactive in communicating with the media and 
the public. The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is the 
key coordinator for interagency coordination (Department of Defense). Public affairs 
guidance is developed and disseminated through all public affairs channels in the 
Department of Defense. The public affairs guidance is staffed through various entities 
such as the State Department and its embassies, civil affairs, country assessment teams, 
host governments, allied force public affairs teams, the four US military services, and 
their subordinate commands (U.S. Army, 1997). 
Military Crisis Communication Case Studies 
My Lai Massacre 
American military personnel performing a mission in the Vietnamese hamlet of 
My Lai 4 killed more than 500 innocent civilians in 1968. News of the crisis slowly 
percolated out to the masses because of the dogged pursuit of justice by an ex-Army 
soldier and an intrepid young reporter. The Army used various unethical 
communications tactics at different stages of the crisis. These tactics included lying, 
stonewalling, and censoring. The crisis and resulting media coverage stretched out for 
many years because of the criminal prosecution of the lone officer charged in the case -
Lieutenant William Calley. 
Crisis communication response. November 14, 1974, more than six years after 
the My Lai massacre and four years after the report's completion, the government 
released the Peers Report. Lieutenant General William Peers investigated the alleged 
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events that took place in the My Lai hamlet March 16, 1968. The findings were 
comprehensive and startling - the efforts to conceal what occurred at My Lai were 
widespread in the Army. 
Two soldiers who witnessed the massacre were particularly culpable. "On 16 
March, a two-man team from the 31st Public Information Detachment, accompanied C/l-
20 Inf on the combat assault. These men, SGT (now Mr.) Ronald Haeberle, photographer, 
and SP5 (now Mr.) Jay Roberts, journalist, witnessed numerous war crimes committed by 
members of C/1-20 Inf in My Lai (4)" (Peers, 1970, p. 5). Using his personal and 
government-owned cameras, Haeberle took numerous photos - he used color film for the 
atrocities and black and white film for the other activities (Peers). According to Peers, 
Haeberle and Roberts discussed what they had seen after leaving the operations area. 
Haeberle said he wondered how the press could use the photos he had taken at My Lai 
(Peers). 
Hours after the massacre, Roberts wrote a story about the incident that made no 
mention of the atrocities he witnessed. Instead, he praised the efforts of the task force. 
"Roberts wrote the story based on the official statistics and gave it to his superior officer. 
T just figured it'd look real bad, and it wasn't my problem'" (Hersh, 1970, p. 78). The 
article cited false details, such as the amount of enemy forces killed and that artillery had 
been called in before the ground assault (Hersh). His article was coordinated up to the 
brigade press officer, Lieutenant Arthur Dunn, who thought the veracity of the article 
details were suspect, but he had seen misleading articles before and it wasn't out of the 
ordinary (Hersh). Dunn dictated the article by telephone the night of the massacre to the 
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Americal Division press office. The Americal Division copied it verbatim and sent one 
copy to Saigon for release to the press, and another for its internal daily newsletter 
(Hersh). The articles reported nothing close to reality and made no mention of civilian 
casualties (Hersh). Details from the report were printed in a The New York Times article, 
"G.I.'s, in Pincer Move, Kill 128 in a Daylong Battle" (1968). 
Peers noted that neither Haeberle nor Roberts reported the atrocities they 
witnessed at My Lai (1970). These two men were only present to historically document 
the operation and were not part of the task force. Instead they "both actively contributed 
to the suppression of information concerning the incident" (Peers, p. 6). Peers 
condemned Haeberle and Roberts because they were in better position to report the 
atrocities than the enlisted men in the task force. Haeberle and Roberts did not face the 
same retaliation the task force enlisted men feared. 
The scandal unfolds. The New York Times first published an article about the 
operation at My Lai March 17, 1968. The reporter cited an American spokesman in the 
article, and essentially reprinted the false accounts released by the Americal Division 
press office ("G.I.'s, in Pincer Move, Kill 128 in a Daylong Battle," 1968). As rumors 
and first hand accounts of the massacre swirled in Vietnam, the news did not reach the 
American press until the Army charged Calley for murdering My Lai civilians in 1969. 
According to Hersh (1970), news stories of the massacre were first published in May 
1968 in the French-language publications Sud Vietname en Lutte and Bulletin du 
Vietnam, published by the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris peace talks. The 
massacre was also included in a report at the July 1968 World Conference of Jurists for 
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Vietnam in Grenoble, France. A year after the massacre occurred, a discharged soldier 
from Arizona, Ronald Ridenhour, mailed letters to President Nixon, senators, 
congressmen, and various Pentagon and State Department officials (Hersh). The letter 
caught the attention of two officials - Democratic Representatives Morris Udall from 
Arizona and L. Mendel Rivers from South Carolina. Both men pressured the military to 
investigate the allegations, and the Army Inspector General was soon assigned to the case 
(Hersh). 
According to Hersh, the "first public hint of the My Lai 4 massacre was a blandly 
worded news release issued to the Georgia press on Friday afternoon, September 5, by 
the public information office at Fort Benning" (1970, p. 128). The release announced the 
charges filed against Calley, but did not include any details about the charges (Hersh). 
Hersh said there were no military regulations preventing the release of more detailed 
information, but the Army said the specific charges could jeopardize the rights of the 
accused. The New York Times reprinted an Associated Press story on page 38 that 
repeated the facts stated in the release (Hersh). There were no additional details printed 
in the press about Calley. According to Hersh, "a few Pentagon officers actually thought 
Calley could be court-martialed without attracting any significant public attention" (p. 
132). 
Hersh broke the My Lai massacre story November 12, 1969 (Hersh, 1970). His 
article was offered by the Dispatch News Service, and more than thirty newspapers 
subsequently picked up the story (Hersh). The New York Times Southeast Asian 
correspondent, Henry Kamm, later pursued the story in Vietnam. According to Hersh, 
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the Army flew Kamm and a representative from Newsweek magazine to the relocation 
hamlet where some My Lai 4 survivors lived. The Army gave the reporters only an hour 
to conduct interviews, and the public information officer taped all interviews. When 
Kamm requested an interview with the military commander for Vietnam, he said the 
public information officer in Saigon "treated me very coolly. He apparently felt that I had 
ratted on our side" (Hersh, p. 136). The New York Times competitors treated Kamm's 
dispatch with skepticism, and there were only a few editorial comments written about the 
massacre (Hersh). The Army formally announced Calley's court-martial November 25, 
1969, but the newspapers continued to treat the brewing scandal with caution and 
abstained from commenting editorially (Hersh). 
The Army goes public. When Calley's trial started in November 1969, the Army 
was in a tough position. According to Hersh, an anonymous source said, "If they don't 
prosecute somebody for this, the Army's going to get clobbered. And if the story ever 
breaks without the Army taking action, it would be even worse" (1970, p. 123). The 
Army could not suppress the story and struggled to institute proper crisis communication 
practices during the trial. Throughout the trial, the primary themes communicated by the 
military were minimum disclosure, media censorship, and morality. These themes were 
present in military press releases, and official and anonymous comments published in 
media reports. The military's lack of candidness led to an increase of scapegoating 
frames. There were many parties communicating with the media - from eyewitnesses to 
anonymous military sources. Consequently, the military's crisis communication response 
appeared muddled. 
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No comment. The New York Times coverage was constantly peppered with "no 
comment" quotes from Army public affairs personnel. Multiple headlines hinted at the 
Army's unwillingness to fully disclose information or comment about the investigations 
and trials. The headlines read, "Men at Pentagon Decline To Comment on Verdict" 
(1971), "Officials at Fort Benning Silent On New Calley Move by Nixon" (Wooten, 
1971), and "Pentagon Is Silent On Mylai Charges" (1972). In the article, "Men at 
Pentagon Decline To Comment on Verdict," Major General Winant Sidle, Army chief of 
public information, said his office expected requests for comment about the Calley 
verdict in March 1971. After receiving the requests, Sidle said the Army had no reaction 
because there was no fitting reaction. The New York Times added descriptive wording to 
further detail the uncooperative nature of the Army's stonewalling, '"There will be no 
formal response,'" an information officer said flatly, countering announcements that 
official reaction was forthcoming" (Wooten, p. 57). One spokesman noted that legal 
officers prevented him from commenting on the case because it was still pending review 
("Pentagon Is Silent On Mylai Charges"). One account of the Army's lack of 
communication was even sarcastic. "And the Army called a news conference to 
announce that nothing would be announced" (Shuster, 1970, p. 11). The no comment 
frame was present through the duration of Calley's legal proceedings. 
Government calls for media self-censorship. The New York Times did not begin 
to thoroughly report on the My Lai massacre until Calley's trial started in November 
1969. Initial reports focused on eyewitness accounts and military censorship. 
Immediately after Calley's trial began, the military judge, prosecution, and defense 
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complained that the media reported too much information about the My Lai massacre, 
which put Calley at an unfair disadvantage. The military judge, Colonel Kennedy, 
suggested in an article that the media should censor its own coverage ("News Media 
Given Clearance," 1969). The media continued to publish interviews with My Lai 
witnesses who had already separated from the military. An article reported the headline, 
"Calley Lawyers and Judge Meet: Violations of Publicity Ban Disturb Col. Kennedy" 
(1969). In the article Kennedy was asked what authority he had to restrict the media or 
witnesses from talking, and he responded with, "I have no comment" (p. 15). The 
defense and prosecution also argued for an injunction to restrict media coverage of the 
trial (Kenworthy, 1969). 
The military's quotes about the press interfering with the judicial process gave 
great fodder to the press to report on military attempts to censor the media. Kennedy 
often commented on the importance of giving Calley a fair trial, and media cooperation 
was a critical component of a free trial. '"This is not to be a trial by the press,"' Kennedy 
said ("Calley Judge Calls for Inquiry," 1969, p. 16). There was a lack of editorial 
comment about the military's efforts to quiet the press, "These legal maneuverings over 
publicity were reported without comment...although it was still extremely unclear 
whether the basic goal of the Kennedy court was to protect the Army from further 
adverse publicity or to protect Lieutenant Calley's rights" (Hersh, 1970, p. 163). 
According to Hersh, members of Calley's Charlie Company ignored the ban on talking to 
the media, and these interviews dominated the news coverage until December 1969. 
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When the ex-soldiers were subpoenaed to speak in court, some refused to testify to 
prevent from incriminating themselves (Bigart, 1970). 
Following orders defense. As the censorship frames subsided, Calley's defense 
argument became the primary news frame. Calley admitted to killing the Vietnamese 
civilians at My Lai 4, but allegedly only did so under orders from his commander, 
Captain Ernest Medina. "The defense team.. ..is seeking to prove that the actions of 
Lieutenant Calley- and the orders of Captain Medina - were legitimate, lawful acts of 
war" (Hammer, 1970, p. 140). Calley's lawyer, George W. Latimer, asserted that Calley 
assumed his orders from Medina were '"the way higher officers conducted the war'" 
(Hammer, p. 140). The New York Times editorial staff and the public hotly debated the 
nature of warfare and following orders. The following orders defense did not hold up in 
the military court, and Calley was convicted March 29, 1971. 
Army takes the moral high road. Another news frame presented by the media was 
the morality frame. The Army received negative publicity from the public for 
prosecuting Calley. "The Army, defending itself against public outcry against the trial 
and conviction of First Lieut. William L. Calley Jr., said today that it had 'a moral and 
legal obligation' to prosecute him" (Naughton, 1971, p. 1). The trial prosecutor was 
especially adamant about the military's obligation to prosecute the perpetrator of the My 
Lai massacre, even after President Nixon had come to Calley's defense: 
Captain Daniel wrote that he was 'shocked and dismayed' by the public criticism 
of the court-martial verdict and could attribute it only to emotional reaction by 
those who were unaware of the evidence in the case.. .He said that it was 
'shocking' to see many Americans fail to grasp what he saw as the moral issue 
involved in the Calley case. ("Calley Prosecutor Asserts Nixon Undermines 
Justice," 1971, p. 1) 
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This communication theme provoked The New York Times to defend the Army and 
Daniel. "Captain Daniel's letter.. .ought to be read in every schoolroom of America as a 
courageous statement of what this country is really all about: respect for human freedom, 
for individual rights and for impartial justice under law" ("The Calley Issues," 1971, p. 
40). 
Whitewash accusations. Throughout the entire judicial process, The New York 
Times articles raised the accountability question: Was Calley the Army's My Lai 
scapegoat? One by one, as Calley's commanding officers in the chain-of-command were 
acquitted of punishment, "whitewash," "scapegoating," and "cover up" were 
characterizations included in coverage and editorial pieces. "The Army and the nation so 
far have backed away from demanding the full accounting that justice and conscience 
require" ("Judgment at Fort Benning," 1971, p. 3). The Army was accused of trying to 
avoid additional embarrassment by refusing to prosecute higher-ranking officers, "The 
dismissal of the charges against General Koster - after he had been punished 
administratively- is a strong hint that the Pentagon has no stomach for broadening of the 
Mylai question" (Graham, 1971, p. 18). The stories of cover up and lack of 
accountability continued until 1974. 
Public opinions. During Calley's trial, he received support from politicians and 
the public. In January 1970 55% of the American public believed Calley was made a 
scapegoat by the government ("Most Back Calley in a Poll for Time," 1970). Citizens 
circulated petitions protesting the fact that one officer was blamed for the My Lai 
massacre (Charlton, 1971a). Politicians, such as Governor George Wallace, blamed the 
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media as well. "The former Governor, who did most of the talking, criticized the news 
media for their handling of the alleged massacre at Songmy in 1968" ("Calley Meets 
With Wallace," 1970, p. 1). One politician said the massacre was a hoax and accused the 
media of acting "as a weapon of psychological warfare" (Hersh, 1970, p. 156). Military 
officers were also disturbed. "Many of the officers believe that the Calley case has been 
a catalyst for those elements of public opinion, left and right, that abuse and disparage the 
Army" (Middleton, 1971, p. 1). The furor surrounding the case caused Nixon to 
intervene and order Calley's release from jail after his conviction (Charlton, 1971b). 
Table 1 displays the overall themes found in the military's communications with 
the media, the resulting The New York Times news frames, and the apparent effect of the 
coverage. 
Table 1 
My Lai Massacre Themes, Frames, and Effects 
Military Themes The New York Times Frames Effects 
No Comment Censorship Division of war opinion 
Censorship Whitewash 
Morality Following orders 
TARES test. The military decisively failed the TARES test standard during the 
My Lai massacre crisis communication response. Truthfulness, an essential cornerstone 
of the TARES test, was not critical to the military's communication with the public. The 
public affairs personnel intentionally lied in their accounts of the actions at My Lai to 
deceive the public into retaining support for the Vietnam War. During the Calley trial, 
the military continually evaded questions and appeared to be concealing information. 
This contradicts the truthfulness and authenticity portions of the TARES test. The 
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spokespeople were not willing to be identified as persuaders, and answered media queries 
with "no comment" or anonymously. 
The military showed no respect for the American public when lying about the 
massacre. Respect is at the heart of the TARES test. The American public initially 
didn't have a chance to make an informed decision about the war efforts at My Lai. 
Equity is the fourth part of the TARES test, which was also neglected by military 
personnel. When the news was made public, the military noted the propaganda 
advantage that was given to the enemy as a reason why the news should be censored. 
This tactic preyed upon Americans' emotions. Lastly, the military was not socially 
responsible with its communication efforts. The military's image took priority over the 
taxpayer's right to be informed about the actions of the military. 
Overall, the Army failed when applying the TARES test to the My Lai massacre 
case. The military did not consider the ethical ramifications of its communication 
strategy, which ultimately affected its credibility with American and international 
stakeholders. It could also be argued that the lack of candidness contributed to the 
declining support for the war effort in Vietnam. The military did not ethically deliberate 
the ramifications of its crisis communication tactics - instead it communicated according 
to what it thought was best for the overall war effort and Army image. The military 
learned that the presence of television and other technological innovations negated its 
ability to cover up the truth of military operations and crisis situations. Ethics and 
openness with the media must be considered in operations to retain the support of the 
American public. 
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Black Hawk Shootdown 
After the Gulf War ended in 1991, the U.S. military kicked-off Operation Provide 
Comfort, which was a U.S. coalition operation that provided protection and humanitarian 
aid to Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq (Piper, 2000). The Air Force also patrolled the 
No-Fly Zone in Northern Iraq as part of Operation Provide Comfort. The humanitarian 
operation was turned into a crisis when two Air Force F-15 fighter jets shot down two 
U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters. Twenty-six coalition personnel were killed in the 
friendly fire incident. The Air Force immediately flooded the media with crisis 
communication messaging such as remorse and accountability. The crisis dragged on 
because no personnel were held criminally accountable, and the families of the deceased 
personnel voiced their frustrations to the media and politicians. 
Crisis communication response. The day of the shootdown, the government 
officials were in front of the cameras apologizing and calling for accountability to find 
what went wrong before the two Black Hawks were shot down over Iraq. CNN reported 
the shootdown shortly after the incident; officials had to respond immediately because the 
news was all over the globe. General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and Dr. William Perry, Secretary of Defense, held a televised news conference 
April 14, 1994. They promised a full investigation and to hold the responsible persons 
accountable (Piper, 2000). The officials made these promises to the families and victims. 
At the government-sponsored memorial service, Perry said, "Operation Provide 
Comfort was a very complex operation and no system will ever be one hundred percent 
perfect.. ..When something does go wrong, I plead to you that we will have a full 
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accountability of what happened" (Piper, 2000, p. 100). Shalikashvili noted in the 
service: 
This loss cuts deeper, for this tragedy touches the very fabric of our institution. 
An institution whose code, whose passion it is to take care of each other and to 
protect each other from any danger. And when that goes wrong, as it did eleven 
days ago, our hearts are doubly heavy, and our grief especially deep.. ..We can't 
alter the events of April 14, we can only mourn and we can strengthen our resolve 
to learn the truth. (Piper, pp. 100-101) 
The families were barraged with questions from the media, yet functioned outside 
the control of military public affairs officers. The mother of one of the victims said she 
"would rather give an interview and have reporters use our words than have them make 
up something on their own" (Piper, 2000, p. 83). Initially, the parents were supportive of 
the military and were willing to be patient with the investigative and judicial processes. 
The officials' initial calls for accountability reassured the families and the public that 
personnel would be held responsible for the act that killed 26 people. 
Series of errors. July 13, 1994, Perry and Shalikashvili held a news conference to 
announce the investigation findings of the Black Hawk shootdown. They started off by 
explaining the scope of the investigation: 
It is a full and complete documentation and disclosure of what occurred. It 
involved thirty-one people who began the investigation the day after the accident 
occurred. They spent more than twenty thousand hours and interviewed one 
hundred thirty-seven witnesses. Additionally several thousand hours were spent 
testing and inspecting the equipment involved in the accident and they conducted 
more than one hundred separate airborne flying tests with F-15s and Black Hawk 
helicopters. It's a tragedy that never should have happened. (Piper, 2000, p. 129-
130) 
Shalikashvili said, "There were a shocking number of instances where people failed to do 
their job properly" (Piper, p. 130). This statement set the stage for the military's primary 
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crisis communication theme: the Black Hawk shootdown occurred because of a series of 
human errors. 
Questions of accountability. September 8, 1994, the Air Force announced the 
charges against the military personnel involved with the Black Hawk shootdown. Five 
AW ACS crewmembers and one of the pilots were charged (Gordon, 1994). When the 
charges were announced, the military's primary crisis communication theme was 
accountability, but added a caveat - the military justice system should be trusted. Perry 
said, '"If individuals are found culpable, we will discipline them.. .we will not rush to 
judgment'" (Gordon, p. 1). The accountability frame initially correlated with the military 
justice frame, yet as the personnel were dismissed, the frames appeared to conflict. Air 
Force officials claimed that justice would be served, but more than one year after the 
incident none of the officers involved had been criminally convicted. The Air Force 
officials had to explain why no one was criminally convicted of killing 26 innocent 
people. 
A Department of Defense spokesman stood firm in a June 1995 press conference, 
and said Perry "wasn't going to second-guess the military justice system. It is a system set 
up to review these incidents, and it has completed its work" (Bacon, 1995, p. 7). During 
this press conference, the media appeared to have a difficult time understanding why the 
officers didn't face stiffer punishments. A reporter said, "Your exhaustive study said that 
there was a failure up and down the chain of command in dozens of areas. Why aren't the 
actions taken against people involved stronger than letters of reprimand" (Bacon, p. 3). 
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The spokesman explained that a letter of reprimand is a harsh punishment and proper 
steps were taken to appropriately punish the responsible individuals. 
The New York Times reported on the incredulity expressed by the media and the 
family members. Perry was asked about the family members complaining that no one 
had been held accountable, and he responded, "No one has been sent to jail, that is 
true.. .But many officers' careers were very adversely affected by this" (Verhovek, 1995, 
p. Al). Another official commented, "An incident like this does not necessarily mean 
that the conduct of all those involved rises to the level of criminal culpability" 
(Verhovek, p. Al). 
Whitewash accusations. The Air Force's inability to clearly explain the judicial 
process created negative news frames in The New York Times. It was reported in 
November 1994 that Lieutenant Colonel May, one of the pilots, avoided charges. Family 
members and anonymous Air Force officers voiced their displeasure with the Air Force's 
decision. '"This was a very cleverly crafted legal strategy to get everyone off,' Joan 
Piper said. 'If General Shalikashvili can say this was truly shocking, and yet we can find 
no one accountable, then you judge for yourself" (Schmitt, 1994c, p. A14). The 
scapegoat term was used in June 1995 as a label for the court-martial of Captain Wang, 
one of the surveillance aircraft personnel. "Captain Wang said during the noon break 
today that he was being made a scapegoat for a military service that needed a conviction 
but would not prosecute its stars, the fighter pilots" (Peterson, 1995, p. 6). When Wang 
was acquitted June 1995, relatives of the deceased helicopter crews asserted that the 
entire military justice process was a legal strategy to nowhere (Verhovek, 1995). 
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Military leaks. Joan Piper wrote a book chronicling her experience after her 
daughter was killed in the Black Hawk shootdown (2000). She wrote about her 
experiences dealing with the media, the military, and other family members. Her 
husband was an Air Force veteran, so they were inclined to support the military and 
exercise patience with the investigative process. Soon after the investigative process 
began, Piper noticed that the military had a tendency to leak information before it was 
officially released to the families and the public. Piper read in July 1994 a quote from a 
senior officer who noted that eight officers were charged in the shootdown case. The 
families hadn't yet been briefed on the findings, and subsequently Piper and the other 
family members said that Air Force personnel were officially leaking the information to 
shape the media coverage in the Air Force's favor (Piper). The multiple human errors 
frame was leaked prior to report release as well. This leak was published in The New 
York Times, '"Multiple human error was responsible for this horrible tragedy,' said one 
senior Defense Department official" (Schmitt, 1994a, p. Al). The military's lack of 
communication and propensity to leak information angered the families and caused them 
to protest against the military's actions. 
Family outrage. August 27, 1994, Perry announced that families of the 11 foreign 
nationals killed in Black Hawk shootdown were to receive ex gratia payments. Each 
foreign family was paid $100,000, and additionally, the families of the Kurdish workers 
who were employed by the U.S. government received death benefits from the Department 
of Labor (Piper, 2000). "The Pentagon statement noted that the United States was not 
obligated by the United States or international law to make any payments, and said that 
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they were a 'humanitarian gesture' made at Mr. Perry's discretion" (Schmitt, 1994b, p. 
9). The U.S. military families did not receive payments because it was assumed that the 
military members carried life insurance. It turned out that not all family members 
received monetary compensation; Lieutenant Laura Piper was not insured. The military's 
refusal to compensate the U.S. military families triggered the family members to start a 
letter-writing campaign to congressional representatives. According to Piper, "The other 
critical avenue to success is the press. Lawmakers are heavily influenced by the press" (p. 
174). The New York Times reported the families were fighting for principle (Schmitt, 
1995). The military stood its ground and said it had been equitable to the U.S. families in 
comparison to the foreign families because all members of the armed forces had life 
insurance (Schmitt). In 2000, the family members finally received monetary 
compensation (Piper). 
Table 2 displays the overall themes found in the military's communications with 
the media, the resulting The New York Times news frames, and the apparent effect of the 
coverage. 
Table 2 
Black Hawk Shootdown Themes, Frames, and Effects 
Military Themes The New York Times Frames Effects 
Remorse Series of errors Family anger 
Accountability Whitewash/scapegoat Additional investigations 
Series of errors 
Leaks 
TARES test. Overall, the ethical validity of the military's communication efforts 
in response to the Black Hawk shootdown improved when compared to the My Lai 
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massacre. The military was forthright and honest in its communication with the public. 
Authenticity was not always exercised though - the constant leaking of information 
showed that officials weren't willing to go on the record. This damaged the military's 
credibility with the families, which ultimately damaged the military's image in the news 
frames. Respect was also lacking in the military's response. Again, the families' 
concerns were publicly neglected, which displayed the military's lack of respect in 
communicating ethically. The military was more concerned with shaping the message 
and its image with the public. Military considerations, such as bureaucratic processes 
and military justice proceedings, also contributed to the neglect of the families' concerns. 
The military did not appear to take advantage of the audience's vulnerabilities in 
its communications with the media, so it passed the equity portion of the test. Lastly, the 
military appeared to exercise social responsibility. Even though the military sometimes 
failed to effectively communicate the investigation process and military justice system, 
nonetheless, they attempted to be responsible in communicating the processes to the 
media. In the Black Hawk shootdown case the military wasn't ethically infallible with its 
crisis communication practices, but it vastly improved from the Vietnam era two decades 
earlier. 
Abu Ghraib Prison Abuse 
Operation Iraqi Freedom stirred global controversy because of its preemptive 
nature. The graphic photos of U.S. military personnel abusing Iraqi prisoners added fuel 
to the already blazing fire of negative public opinion of the war in Iraq. Nevertheless, the 
U.S. government went into proactive crisis communications mode in response to the Abu 
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Ghraib abuse photos. High-level government officials were remorseful and apologetic. 
But the proactive messaging was ineffective by a lack of high-ranking accountability, 
which ultimately prompted cover up allegations. 
Crisis communication response. Army investigators became aware of Abu 
Ghraib prison abuse allegations January 14, 2004, and the military publicly issued a five-
sentence English-language statement two days later (Jehl & Schmitt, 2004). The 
statement acknowledged the abuse allegations and stated that the allegations were under 
investigation (Jehl & Schmitt). In an interview with The Washington Post, General 
Karpinski said she volunteered to address the Iraqi people a week after investigators 
started investigating the Abu Ghraib prison abuse allegations. General Sanchez 
purportedly denied her request (Jehl & Schmitt). 
No further information was publicly released until March 21, 2004 when 
Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, deputy director of operations for the joint task force, 
announced the prison abuse charges in a Baghdad press conference. The New York Times 
published Kimmitt's primary theme: "The coalition takes all reports of detainee abuse 
seriously, and all allegations of mistreatment are investigated. We are committed to 
treating all persons under coalition control with dignity, respect and humanity" (Shanker, 
2004, p. 14). No specifics were released during the briefing because 
Defense Department officials acknowledged that the command in Baghdad was 
reluctant to say too much at the outset because of the continuing criminal 
investigation and, to some extent, because of the reaction in Iraq and throughout 
the Arab world to sketchy reports of serious abuses at Army-run prisons that had 
been photographed. (Jehl & Schmitt, p. 10) 
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April 28, 2004, Kimmitt again briefed the media at a press conference in Baghdad 
- but the timing of this conference was tied to the scheduled airing of the Abu Ghraib 
abuse photos. Kimmitt expanded on the allegations and charges against six military 
personnel. A reporter from the Chicago Tribune noted during the press conference, "It 
sounds as if you're only offering this information because it's going to go out on TV 
tonight" (Kimmitt, 2004, p. 4). Kimmitt vehemently defended the military's 
communication with the press about Abu Ghraib, and listed the proactive actions the 
military had taken to inform the press about the investigation. The photographs were 
made public later that day on CBS's 60 Minutes II. Two weeks before, CBS notified the 
Pentagon of its plans to broadcast the photos. General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attempted to delay CBS from broadcasting the photos to avoid 
inciting violence and hostility in an already dangerous environment (Risen, 2004). The 
general was only delaying the inevitable - the photos sparked global outrage after being 
released April 28, 2004. 
Kimmitt said that the Army would do everything in its power to properly train, 
resource, and discipline personnel so these types of abuses never happened again 
(Williams, 2004). Kimmitt voiced the collective embarrassment and shame the Army felt 
over the actions that happened at Abu Ghraib (Williams). Secretary Rumsfeld 
apologized and publicly held him accountable for what happened at Abu Ghraib, "as 
secretary of defense I am accountable for them, and I take full responsibility" (Garamone, 
2004b, para. 2). 
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Lesson on democracy. The graphic images of Iraqis being degraded, humiliated, 
and beaten, flooded newscasts around the globe. U.S. government officials went 
immediately on the defensive, and attempted to dampen the hostile emotions evoked 
from domestic and international audiences. On NBC's Today Show, May 5, 2004, host 
Matt Lauer interviewed Rumsfeld: 
Lauer: You've talked about the war of ideas. How do these photos, how do these 
incidents, impact that war of ideas? 
Rumsfeld: Harmful. 
Lauer: Just one word? 
Rumsfeld: Well, I've responded. I don't know what else one can say. There's no 
question that when any citizen, soldier or civilian, breaks the law, abuses people 
in a manner that's inconsistent with the way people are trained and taught and 
with the way decent human beings behave, then that's harmful to the United 
States. (Lauer, 2004, p. 4) 
Rumsfeld also claimed that enemies were sure to exploit the abuses to further publicize 
their negative opinions of the U.S., and the claims could be rebroadcast via regional 
media (Miles, 2004). The secretary also used the events surrounding the scandal to 
publicize the strength of the American democracy: 
In the past two weeks, the United States has offered the world a seminar on what 
happens when things go wrong in a democracy. The world has seen those 
shameful pictures, but the same world has watched the United States government 
take responsibility and apologize to those individuals who were wronged. It's 
watched senior civilian and military leadership come to Congress to testify under 
oath about what was known and what has been done. It's watched a free media 
publish stories of all types, from the accurate to the grossly distorted. Iraq and the 
watching world have seen that in our country, no one is above the law, that we are 
a nation governed by laws. (Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 5) 
President George W. Bush went on the defensive. May 7, 2004, President Bush 
apologized to the Middle East via the satellite channel Al Arabiya, and stated that the 
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abuses "represent the actions of a few people.. .it's important for people to understand that 
in a democracy that there will be a full investigation" (Hauser, 2004, p. 6). Secretary of 
State Colin Powell apologized and defended American servicemembers and values: 
He praised the bulk of American soldiers in Iraq as 'wonderful young men and 
women.' But, in his closest approach to an outright apology, he said: 'Our heads 
bow. Our hearts ache over what a small number of them did at that prison. There's 
no excuse for that.' (Cowell, 2004, p. 18) 
Officials commend investigation efforts. Department of Defense press releases 
and news articles quoted senior military officials praising the military for its swift and 
thorough response to the abuse allegations. "Rumsfeld praised Army Spc. Joseph Darby 
for stepping forward with his concerns. He also praised the military chain of command 
for its quick and effective actions once the allegations were known" (Garamone, 2004b, 
para. 8). Rumsfeld lauded the military's proactive outreach when the allegations were 
initially made. '"The military, not the media, discovered these abuses,' the secretary 
said. 'The military reported the abuses, not the media'" (Miles, 2004, para. 5). The 
military consistently reassured the public that the Army was investigating the allegations 
with dogged determination, and the soldiers would be held accountable. 
A few bad apples. The calls for accountability were soon directed toward a small 
group of military policemen who sat at the bottom of the military chain-of-command. A 
Department of Defense news article invoked the term, "a few bad apples" to describe the 
ragtag outfit of military policemen (Gilmore, 2004, para. 1). The non-military 
independent panel charged with investigating Abu Ghraib described the situation as an 
'"Animal House' on the night shift" (Garamone, 2004a, para. 13). According to the 
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government, the carousing bad apples were an aberration and not indicative of systemic 
problems. 
Following orders. The accused soldiers defended themselves and claimed they 
were ordered to take the actions documented in the photos. The defendants also claimed 
that there was "no support, no training whatsoever" (Barringer, 2004, p. 12). Specialist 
Charles Graner argued he "was acting under legal orders - a viable defense under 
military law, even if the orders were in fact illegal" (Zernike, 2005, p. 18). The 
defendants had civilian lawyers who also functioned as their spokespersons. "Sergeant 
Cardona's civilian defense lawyer, Harvey J. Volzer, said his client had done what his 
training and senior officers demanded: protect fellow soldiers and scare inmates" ("Dog 
Handler Convicted in Abu Ghraib Abuse," 2005, p. 18). The defense that the soldiers 
were following orders did not gain traction, and were eventually found guilty of abusing 
prisoners at Abu Ghraib. 
Whitewash accusations. One-by-one, as the low ranking soldiers were convicted 
of abuse, The New York Times quoted civilian lawyers and the accused asserting that the 
Abu Ghraib investigation was a whitewash and the soldiers were scapegoats. '"I feel that 
all seven M.P.'s are being made scapegoats,' Guy Womack, the civilian lawyer for 
Specialist Graner, told reporters after his client's hearing. 'No one can suggest with a 
straight face that these M.P.'s were acting alone'" (Wong, 2004, p. 1). Politicians also 
voiced their concerns, and nearly accused one of the investigation heads of whitewash 
(Schmitt, 2004). The New York Times editorial page accused the military of 
whitewashing the Abu Ghraib investigation ("Abu Ghraib, Whitewashed," 2004, "No 
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Accountability on Abu Ghraib," 2004, "Patterns of Abuse," 2005). One lawyer of the 
accused noted that if one soldier is convicted, than their superiors should be convicted, 
which turns into a domino effect up the chain of command (Bernstein, 2004). The 
highest-ranking officer punished was Karpinski, and she repeatedly claimed that the 
military made her a scapegoat for her superiors (Schmitt, 2005). 
Public opinion. International and domestic audiences projected disgust and 
dismay in reaction to the Abu Ghraib abuse photos. The New York Times devoted 
coverage to American opinions, and found that the publication of the photos repulsed 
Americans, but they still felt protective for the troops in Iraq. The public believed that 
the few responsible soldiers should be held accountable, but not Rumsfeld. '"Why blame 
Rumsfeld when he wasn't even involved?' asked Dorothy Whittemore, 83, a retired 
librarian from New Orleans. 'At a time of war, you have to stay the course and you 
certainly shouldn't change leaders'" (Jacobs, 2004, p. 11). Others acknowledged that 
during war, bad events are bound to occur: 
'This is war. It's not right, but war's not right,' Mr. Neil said. 'Given the 
circumstances, I don't see how they would not do something - after seeing their 
buddies dragged through the streets. They're over there to give the Iraqis freedom, 
and they're getting killed every day.' (Jacobs, p. 11) 
Another effect of the photos, which was addressed by government officials in length, was 
the damage done to the America's image abroad. '"The Arabs already hate us, and now 
we're giving them even more reason to hate us and get revenge,' said Rosalind Gittings, 
60, a teacher from Baltimore" (Jacobs, p. 11). Rich said 80% of Americans disapprove 
of the prison abuses (2005). The few bad apples frame went unchallenged by the public 
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at-large, but the paper accused the media of trivializing the story to the American public 
(Rich). 
Table 3 displays the overall themes found in the military's communications with 
the media, the resulting The New York Times news frames, and the apparent effect of the 
coverage. 
Table 3 
Abu Ghraib Prison Abuse Scandal Themes, Frames, and Effects 
Military Themes The New York Times Frames Effects 
Proactive response Following orders Lower public opinion 
Actions un-American Whitewash 
Few bad apples Cover up 
TARES test. Although the military's image was negatively affected by the Abu 
Ghraib prison abuse scandal, the military appeared to ethically communicate with the 
public. The military initially announced the Abu Ghraib charges to the media. The 
pictures were not released because Taguba felt that the photos could cause violent 
uprisings in the Middle East (Hersh, 2004). Based upon military and media accounts, the 
photos were not deceptively concealed before they were leaked to the public. The facts 
about who initiated the abuses were veiled in secrecy because of classification concerns, 
so the military was prevented from being totally open and truthful. 
The equity portion of the TARES test is called into question when applied to Abu 
Ghraib. The U.S. officials' fear appeals were persuasive preyed upon the vulnerabilities 
of the public. The military claimed that the photos would cause violent uprisings abroad 
and an increase in terrorist attacks. This fear appeal may have influenced some 
Americans to demand the photos be censored. Before the scandal, the U.S. military and 
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politicians were attempting to win the "hearts and minds" of Middle Eastern and Iraqi 
citizens. The U.S. government upheld the social responsibility and respect portions of the 
test in communicating honestly and remorsefully to its target audiences in the Middle 
East. Operation Iraqi Freedom was not a popular war from the start, so although the 
military officials crisis communication practices appeared ethical, their actions seemed 
pointless because the American government lacked credibility before the scandal was 
made public. 
Impact of Culture and Technology 
Effect of Military Culture on Media Relations 
During the Civil War, General William Tecumseh Sherman said, "I hate 
Newspapermen. They come into camp and pick up their camp rumors and print them as 
facts. I regard them as spies, which, in truth they are. If I killed them all there would be 
news from Hell before breakfast" (Defense Information School, 2005f, p. 12). The 
military attempts to protect and control information as a means for defending the nation 
and protecting national security. On the other hand, the media endeavor to communicate 
openly with the public because it is an attribute of a healthy, functioning democracy. 
Because the military and media have differing communication philosophies, the two 
institutions experience strain during war. Widening the gap between military and media 
cultures is the social and economic differences of the two professions. According to 
English (2005), "The military draws largely from the mass of citizens that tend to have a 
nationalistic mindset while journalists largely come from the cosmopolitan elite" (p. 24). 
72 
Case study findings. The clash of these two iconic cultures were apparent in the 
crisis communication case study analysis of the 1967 My Lai massacre, 1994 Black 
Hawk friendly fire shootdown, and 2005 Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal. But the 
dynamics changed in each crisis. In the aftermath of the My Lai massacre, the military 
lied and suppressed information from the media fearing that the enemy could use the 
information as a propaganda weapon. After news of the massacre was made public and 
the resulting trial ensued, public affairs officers were often quoted not commenting to the 
media. This evasive treatment of the media symbolized that the military was in 
reputation protection mode. The military also attempted to censor the media from airing 
interviews with My Lai witnesses, but the military did not have the power to censor the 
media. During the crisis communication response to the Black Hawk shootdown, the 
military often leaked information to the press instead of going on-the-record. This gave 
the media information, but undercut the military's reputation during a contentious 
investigation and trial. The information subsidy pendulum swung in the opposition 
direction from My Lai when the military worked with the media during the Abu Ghraib 
scandal. The government proactively communicated to the media, but with a hint of 
resentment. Addressing the conservative Heritage Foundation May 17, 2004, Rumsfeld 
told the audience that the U.S. was a model of democracy, leaders had apologized and 
taken responsibility, and the free media published accurate and "grossly distorted" news 
about Abu Ghraib (Rumsfeld, 2004). 
Before the Abu Ghraib photos originally aired, the military attempted to prevent 
CBS from publicizing the photographs, but the media resisted and aired the photos. 
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Myers said, "The story about the abuse was already public, but we were concerned that 
broadcasting the actual pictures could further inflame the tense situation that existed then 
in Iraq and further endanger the lives of coalition soldiers and hostages" (Garamone, 
2004b, para. 13). The threat of propaganda and violence did not impede journalists from 
reporting stories, especially with increased online competition. 
Interview findings. The improvement of relations between the military and media 
was evident in interviews conducted with current and former military public affairs 
personnel. All of the public affairs personnel had worked in public affairs at different 
organizational levels in the military - base, headquarters, and deployed locations. 
Overall, the military personnel held positive to neutral opinions toward the media. A 
former Air Force officer noted: 
Working with the media is a fine art, balancing developing and maintaining good 
relationships with the journalists and working with Air Force officials to prepare 
and refine the message so they feel comfortable talking to the media. If done 
properly, it can be very beneficial, even when the news is negative. (A. Carpenter, 
personal communication, January 31, 2008) 
Cultivating positive relationships with the media was a top priority for the military public 
affairs personnel interviewed for this study. Positive relations ensure that an information 
subsidy is exchanged - the military can publicize its preferred theme or frame through the 
media, and the media can get the information necessary for a compelling story. 
Nonetheless, friction exists because the military does not meet media deadlines or 
news-gathering expectations (R. Johnson, personal communication, January 21, 2008). 
Operational security often functions as the source of the friction, "sometimes media don't 
understand the need for operational security; sometimes commanders hide behind 
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operational security to deny access" (Johnson). The military commander's inability to 
comprehend the role of the press, and vice versa, still causes strife between the two 
professions. "The natural military reaction is to circle the wagons and deny the media, 
the public, and internal audiences their right to know" (T. Somerville, personal 
communication, January 28, 2008). Military commanders have improved their outlook 
after realizing what a good crisis communication plan can do for getting out the military's 
message (T. Somerville). But many military members still have closed attitudes toward 
the media. The military's misconceptions of the media even impinge on the military's 
perception of public affairs. "Due to the lack of understanding of the PA mission at all 
levels, military PA reps sometimes tend to be viewed as external media even by their own 
service members" (L. Polarek, personal communication, February 6, 2008). 
Internal tensions within the military also arise because of its bureaucratic culture. 
"The hardest part of any communication process is getting information coordinated 
internally before it is released to the public. The chain of command hinders this" (M. 
Nachshen, personal communication, February 10, 2008). Media interview requests and 
queries are often coordinated through multiple layers of organizational bureaucracy, 
which hinders the response time between the military and the media. Reporters can bust 
deadlines because of the bureaucratic coordinating, which does not help the military 
effectively tell its side of the story. The coordination is especially trying overseas. "It 
was very challenging to coordinate messages with the AF and DoD PA folks back in the 
states" (A. Carpenter, personal communication, January 31, 2008). The different time 
zones, lack of timely communication, and message coordination prompted the media to 
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publish conflicting information (Carpenter). Conflicting information released to the 
media has the capability to become a secondary narrative in an overarching storyline 
(Carpenter). The bureaucratic frustrations voiced by the interviewees can be attributed to 
the authoritarian culture of the military. According to Hill (1984), the authoritarian 
nature of the military created the chain-of-command concept, a potential for rapid 
decision-making, and uncritical acceptance of orders. The authoritarian style is necessary 
during wartime operations, but conflicts with the media and America's democratic 
culture. 
The Military Justice System 
The military justice system mostly mirrors the civilian system, but the military's 
differing components have created dissention between the military and media during 
high-profile military trials. 
Case study findings. In every case analyzed in this study, the common 
denominator was the reporter's inability to understand the military justice system. 
"Reprimands and other administrative punishments can certainly wreck a military career 
- a punishment that has no real equivalent in the civilian world - but it's not the same as 
serving time" (Myers, 2004, p. 3). In each case, high-ranking officers often faced 
administrative punishment instead of criminal prosecution. Only a lieutenant was 
criminally prosecuted for the My Lai massacre. 
When the military decided to administratively punish the personnel responsible 
for the Black Hawk shootdown, it created press confusion. In a press conference that 
addressed the administrative punishments, a reporter questioned the severity of a letter of 
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reprimand (Bacon, 1995). The spokesman attempted to explain why this was a 
significant disciplinary action, and why the commanders decided to pursue this 
punishment instead of one that was harsher. The reporter responded, "I'm asking why 
wasn't there, given the fact that so many people died in this, and that there were so many 
instances of failure to carry out rules that are pretty clear, why that's not a stronger 
action" (Bacon, p. 3). The volleys continued and nothing the spokesman said quelled the 
reporter's confusion. This misunderstanding about the military justice system was 
present in the news frames of every case analyzed in this study. The alleged 
scapegoating, coupled with the military's lack of on-the-record interviews during 
investigations and trials, brought negative attention on the military in all three cases. 
Interview results. Somerville echoed the sentiment that the military justice 
system prevents effective communication with the media: 
The military lawyer usually wants the Air Force to keep silent on any details 
affecting matters still to be heard in court. Lawyers defending accused military 
members have no such reluctance; they want the defendants' cries of'innocent!' 
to be heard and they don't mind telling a story in whatever way will best support 
their clients, (personal communication, January 28, 2008) 
Even if the public affairs officer gives the commander a compelling reason for 
communicating during an investigation, the argument is pointless when pitted against a 
military lawyer who has laws and regulations to back his or her reasoning (B. Hoey, 
personal communication, February 19, 2008). 
Evolution of Technology 
Technological innovations have been a double-edged sword for the military. This 
was even apparent in the Civil War. The telegraph allowed the war news to be 
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transmitted across the country in a few hours, as opposed to many days (Defense 
Information School, 2005f). Photographs were taken for the first time during a war, thus 
allowing citizens to see the reality of war. Bloody images coupled with the widespread 
news of defeat threatened President Lincoln's reelection chances in 1864 (Defense 
Information School). Fortunately for the Union, the rapid dissemination of victorious 
news caused an upswing in public opinion (Defense Information School). For the next 
140 years, innovative technologies further increased the speed of communication and 
quality of photography, but the military struggled to harness these technologies to its 
strategic advantage. 
Case study findings. In the Vietnam War, the military faced various challenges 
with technology. Reporters carried small tape recorders and television cameras. 
Emotions and body language were more easily captured via these communication 
technologies (Snow, 2006). "Since reporters recorded the actual words of PA 
spokesmen, denial of previous announcements became more problematic" (Snow, p. 16). 
The military could not deny Haeberle's photographs that documented the atrocities at My 
Lai. The photographs were reprinted in various magazines and broadcast on national 
television news (Hersh, 1970). During the trial, the national broadcast of witness 
interviews captured the nation's attention. The eyewitness accounts and graphic images 
could not be censored by the military. 
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the concept of the "CNN effect" took hold. The 
almost immediate global broadcast of news on CAW drove military and diplomatic 
decision-making and put the military on the defensive. The Black Hawk shootdown was 
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first broadcast on CNN, and some family members knew their loved ones were killed in 
the shootdown before the military gave them official notification (Piper, 2000). During 
the ordeal, families of the deceased military members stayed glued to their television sets: 
During these past few days of waiting for word of when Laura's remains should 
be returned to us, we kept track of the progress via CAW. It is a surreal and 
sobering experience to watch your daughter's casket being loaded on a large Air 
Force cargo plan in Germany for transatlantic flight from the privacy of your 
living room. (Piper, p. 88) 
News was broadcast in real time, so CAW was their information source and not the 
military. The military was slow to catch on, but realized that CAW could "distribute an 
interesting and moderately informative product to a wide audience. The military need not 
compete with, or resent, the media. Rather, the media can liberate us from the delays and 
slants our own bureaucracy imparts" (Zinni, Ellertson, & Allardice, 1992, p. 2). 
Similar to the Pipers family's experience, Lynndie England's parents learned of 
the news about their daughter on television: 
The couple had just returned from a turkey-hunting trip last week when they 
received a message.. .that Lynndie's picture had been on "60 Minutes II" on CBS-
TV. The next morning, Mrs. England brewed herself a pot of coffee, snapped on 
CNN and there, playing over and over and over again, were Private England and 
the Iraqi prisoners. Mrs. England put a hand to her mouth, steadied herself and 
said aloud, 'Oh my god.' (Dao, 2004, p. 1) 
Abu Ghraib captured the public's attention partly because of new communication 
technologies. Disturbing images of the abhorrent prison abuse were captured on digital 
cameras and e-mailed to family, friends, and co-workers of the accused. Besides the 
images broadcast on television, more graphic images were posted on various Internet 
Web sites. 
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Interview findings. All interview participants in this study agreed that there are 
positive aspects in new media technologies. In response to a crisis, the military can now 
release information and have it broadcast immediately, "No more hours on the telephone 
or at the fax machine to release an update; just hit 'send'" (T. Somerville, personal 
communication, January 28, 2008). But the technologies often have a negative impact on 
the military: 
Video and picture taking cell phones become undeniable eyewitnesses and the 
first person to the keyboard wins, regardless of their status or caliber of 
journalistic credentials. The military leadership as a whole does not have a 
concept of the life of a news story and what makes headlines. This puts the 
military and PA practitioners at a serious disadvantage when it comes to timely 
dissemination of accurate information. (A. Carpenter, personal communication, 
January 31,2008) 
The requirement for chain-of-command coordination denotes a lack of 
communication autonomy for public affairs personnel. This combination of no autonomy 
and new media technologies amplifies the bureaucratic culture clash between the military 
and the media. "All of the technological advances such as Web blogs or podcasts are 
useless if you're not able to get factual information out quickly" (R. Johnson, personal 
communication, January 21, 2008). 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
This study confirmed that the military's crisis communication training and 
regulations match closely with Horsley and Barker's (2002) synthesis model. The 
Defense Information School provides in-depth crisis communication training to military 
public affairs personnel. Proactive public outreach and media relations' processes are 
emphasized in the instruction, which are vital components for being prepared for crisis. 
The instruction is based upon the military regulation, Joint Publication 3-61 (Department 
of Defense, 2005). This regulation is rich with information and guidance for public 
affairs personnel who are stationed at home or abroad. The interviews of military public 
affairs personnel validated the effectiveness of the training and its close comparison with 
the synthesis model. 
The My Lai, Black Hawk, and Abu Ghraib crises all had similar problems that 
can be attributed to military cultural deficiencies. The authoritarian culture spawned the 
"following orders" defense in the My Lai and Abu Ghraib cases. Also, the terms 
whitewash and scapegoat were present in the media frames of every case. It was difficult 
to pin blame on the upper echelons of leadership in all three cases. The reasons for this 
were not found in this study, but the researcher recommends this topic be researched in a 
future study. 
Throughout the three case studies, the military steadily improved its ethical 
deliberation. In the case of My Lai, the military did not adhere to any ethical standards 
found in the TARES test. The military learned that ethical deficiencies negatively 
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affected the image and war support in the age of television and instant communications. 
In the Black Hawk case, and even more so during Abu Ghraib, the military knew that 
their messages could be transmitted globally in a matter of minutes. Similarly, lies and 
truth hiding can also be uncovered instantaneously. If this occurs, the original crisis is no 
longer in the limelight. Once uncovered, the cover up is the top story and the military is 
held to account. Even though the military has been accused of lacking ethical fortitude, 
the researcher discovered that the military receives an entire block of ethics instruction 
during public affairs training. Ethics are also emphasized in other military training 
schools. One interviewee who works for a major corporation noted that ethical 
deliberation was utilized in the military more often than in his civilian public relations job 
(R. Fitzgerald, personal communication, February 6, 2008). 
The military's tendency to classify information for operational security reasons 
prevented the proactive disclosure of information and full implementation of the TARES 
test during the Abu Ghraib case. Operational security is a military cultural phenomenon 
that has always been present during war. This runs counter to the openness of a 
democratic free press. The researcher discovered that the military instructs public affairs 
personnel to be open and proactive with the media, and to understand why the media 
functions the way it does. Mutual understanding can overcome the cultural clash, which 
is an observation the interview participants noted. The information subsidy is 
omnipresent during interactions between the media and military public affairs officers. 
The bureaucratic culture of the military slows down the subsidy transaction, but 
forthrightness to the reporter often mitigates resentment. 
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The military justice system was a sore point for the interview participants. 
Military judge advocates have a tendency to prevent public affairs personnel from 
communicating openly with the public. The judge advocate usually wins the argument 
because he or she has laws, regulations, and superior deliberating skills to sway the 
commander. In all three cases, the military justice system caused confusion for the 
media. Reporters did not understand why personnel involved with the crisis situations 
didn't face harsher punishments. The military attempted to persuade the media into 
understanding that nonjudicial punishments, such as a reprimand, were harsh and hurt the 
military member's career. Reporters failed to understand the argument and consequently 
publicized the whitewash frame. In each case, the public overwhelmingly supported the 
few military personnel who faced criminal prosecution. 
In all three case studies, technological innovations caused negative ramifications 
for the military's crisis communication tactics. During the Vietnam War, television sets 
were prevalent in a majority of the American households. Americans heard the military 
and politicians spouting positive messages as the reporters on the ground were reporting 
the opposite. This contradiction was readily apparent on television, and the military 
consequently lost its credibility. The CNN effect took hold in the aftermath of the Gulf 
War. After the accidental shootdown of two Black Hawk helicopters in 1994, the 
military was immediately on television apologizing and making calls for accountability. 
The same was true in the Abu Ghraib case. Technology also made front-page headlines 
in the My Lai and Abu Ghraib cases. Photographs documented the graphic events that 
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took place. The military and personnel on the ground could not deny the truth because 
the reality of the situation was recorded for all to see. 
Limitations in this study included the lack of varied interview participants. The 
researcher could not connect with a Defense Information School instructor. An instructor 
could have explained the reasoning behind the instruction and additional perspective to 
the training materials. In focusing on the military-media culture clash, a reporter who 
had experience working with the military should have been interviewed. 
This study demonstrated that the military has a robust crisis communication 
program, but military cultural considerations prevent public affairs personnel from being 
fully effective in its crisis communication tactics. The authoritarian culture slows down 
response times to media queries, which presents an increasing liability as communication 
technologies evolve and consumer generated media becomes a popular source for 
information. The researcher recommends that all military personnel, particularly 
commanders, receive media literacy and in-depth ethics training. Reporters should also 
be educated about the military and the constraints it faces during wartime. The 
researcher found that the military received negative media coverage because it viewed the 
media as the enemy - not as a conduit for communicating its message. The military must 
find an ethical means for harnessing new media technologies to its advantage. 
Otherwise, its crisis communication program is doomed to fail when put into practice. 
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APPENDIX A 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION 
JP 3-61 
It is the responsibility of the Department of Defense to make available timely and 
accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and 
understand facts about national security and defense strategy. 
Requests for information from organizations and private citizens shall be answered 
quickly. In carrying out that Department of Defense (DOD) policy, the following 
Principles of Information shall apply: 
Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory 
requirements, unless its release is precluded by national security constraints or 
valid statutory mandates or exceptions. 
A free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without 
censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces of the 
United States and their dependents. 
Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government 
from criticism or embarrassment. 
Information shall be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect 
national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the 
Armed Forces. 
DOD's obligation to provide the public with information on DOD major 
programs may require detailed public affairs planning and coordination in the 
DOD and with the other government agencies. 
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APPENDIX B 
AIR FORCE CRISIS PROCEDURES 
AFI 35-101 
Section 7B—Crisis Procedures and Release of Information 
7.5. Procedures. In significant weapon system mishaps, Public Affairs should be in place 
at the PA office, the accident scene, and the installation command post. 
7.5.1. When the accident occurs off the installation in an area accessible to the 
media, a PA person must arrive at the site at the same time as the OSC and the 
IRF. Public Affairs officers must ensure unit contingency plans include 
transportation to the accident site via arrival with the DCG during on-base 
accidents/incidents. 
7.5.2. Regardless of location, establish communication at once between the on-
scene PA representative and those at the installation. This permits Public Affairs 
at the site and those at the PA office to coordinate information for release on a 
timely basis. 
7.5.3. The host Public Affairs office must establish procedures to notify a tenant 
unit commander of any follow-on PA actions in accidents involving that 
commander's resources. 
7.5.4. In accidents or incidents likely to require Public Affairs support for 
extended periods of time, or likely to exceed the capabilities of the responsible PA 
office, Public Affairs should: 
7.5.4.1. Set up a 24-hour news media operations center. If other federal, 
state, and local response force Public Affairs officers are on scene, the 
media center should be a joint operation. 
7.5.4.2. Give Air Force news releases about the accident to state, local, or 
other officials responsible for informing the public and media, or who 
needs the releases for any other purpose. 
7.5.4.3. Anticipate public concerns and issues news releases before such 
concerns distort public perceptions. 
7.5.4.4. Ask the next higher PA echelon for additional people and 
equipment if needed. 
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7.5.4.5. Have each PA staff member record media, and public queries on 
AF Form 39, Response to Query. 
7.5.4.6. Use a central log to record: Time of accident, important 
developments, time of releases, policy received from higher PA echelons 
and how or when it was implemented, and thumbnail sketches of most 
significant queries and events. 
7.5.4.7. Alert switchboard operators to direct all news media and public 
calls to the media center. 
7.5.4.8. Ensure major command and Air Force News Service are included 
as addressees on initial information release and other publicly releasable 
information and images. 
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APPENDIX C 
PAQC ACCIDENT RESPONSE GUIDELINES 
1. We must acknowledge that an accident or incident has occurred. 
2. The time standard for getting out the first release after an accident is ONE HOUR 
after the first notification. 
3. On military installations, names of the dead and injured in an accident cannot be 
released until 24 hours after the next of kin have been notified. 
4. We must provide accurate information. 
5. We must not interpret or speculate about the cause of an accident until it is known 
and made public by an investigation board. Sometimes, that can take several weeks or 
even longer. 
6. You must attribute information when required. 
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APPENDIX D 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. What is your military background (rank, positions, assignments, etc)? 
2. Have you deployed as a PA practitioner? If yes, when and where? 
3. Have you worked at the headquarters level as a PA practitioner? If yes, when and 
where? 
4. Have you instructed at DINFOS? If yes, what subject did you instruct? 
5. What military PA courses have you attended? 
6. Did you receive crisis communication training while in the military? If yes, describe 
the training. 
7. Did you receive ethics training while in the military? If yes, describe the training. 
8. Have you worked in military media relations? If yes, describe your overall impression 
of working with the media. If there was conflict, where did it originate? 
9. Have you had to publicly respond to crisis? If yes, describe each event, your role, the 
military's response, and the resulting media coverage. 
10. If you communicated during a crisis, did you or your co-workers ethically deliberate 
communication tactics? If yes, describe the deliberation in as much detail as possible. 
11. In your opinion, what effect does military culture have on the military's ability to 
effectively communicate internally and externally during a crisis? 
12. In your opinion, what effect does the military justice system have on the military's 
ability to effectively communicate internally and externally during a crisis? 
13. In your opinion, what effect does technology have on the military's ability to 
effectively communicate internally and externally during a crisis? 
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